Organizational Barriers to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Soccer-Ball Producers in Pakistan by Atkin, David et al.
Organizational Barriers to Technology Adoption:
Evidence from Soccer-Ball Producers in Pakistan∗
David Atkin†, Azam Chaudhry‡, Shamyla Chaudry§,
Amit K. Khandelwal¶ and Eric Verhoogen‖
First Draft: December 2013
This Draft: July 2014
Abstract
This paper studies technology adoption in a cluster of soccer-ball producers in Sialkot,
Pakistan. Our research team invented a new cutting technology that reduces waste of the
primary raw material. We allocated the technology to a random subset of producers. Despite
the arguably unambiguous net benefits of the technology for nearly all firms, after 15 months
take-up remained puzzlingly low. We hypothesize that an important reason for the lack
of adoption is a misalignment of incentives within firms: the key employees (cutters and
printers) are typically paid piece rates, with no incentive to reduce waste, and the new
technology slows them down, at least initially. Fearing reductions in their effective wage,
employees resist adoption in various ways, including by misinforming owners about the value
of the technology. To investigate this hypothesis, we implemented a second experiment
among the firms to which we originally gave the technology: we offered one cutter and one
printer per firm a lump-sum payment, approximately equal to a monthly wage, that was
conditional on them demonstrating competence in using the technology in the presence of
the owner. This incentive payment, small from the point of view of the firm, had a significant
positive effect on adoption. We interpret the results as supportive of the hypothesis that
misalignment of incentives within firms is an important barrier to technology adoption in
our setting.
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1 Introduction
Observers of the process of technological diffusion have been struck by how slow it is for many
technologies.1 A number of the best-known studies have focused on agriculture or medicine,2 but
diffusion has also been observed to be slow among large firms in manufacturing. In a classic study
of major industrial technologies, for instance, Edwin Mansfield found that it took more than 10
years for half of major U.S. iron and steel firms to adopt by-product coke ovens or continuous
annealing lines.3 More recently, Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) found
that many Indian textile firms are not using standard (and apparently cheap to implement)
management practices that have diffused widely elsewhere. The surveys by Stoneman (2002),
Hall and Khan (2003) and Hall (2005) contain many more examples.
Why is adoption so slow for so many technologies? The question is key to understanding
the process of economic development and growth. It is also a difficult one to study, especially
among manufacturing firms (Tybout, 2000). It is rare to be able to observe firms’ technology
use directly, and rarer still to have direct measures of the costs and benefits of adoption, or
of what information firms have about a given technology. As a consequence, it is difficult to
distinguish between various possible explanations for low adoption rates.
In this paper, we present evidence from a cluster of soccer-ball producers in Sialkot, Pakistan,
that a conflict of interest between employees and owners within firms is an important barrier
to adoption. The cluster produces 30 million soccer balls a year, or about 40 percent of world
production, including match balls for the 2014 World Cup, and about 70 percent of world hand-
stitched production (Wright, 2010; Houreld, 2014). The setting has two main advantages for
understanding the adoption process. The first is that the industry is populated by a substantial
number of firms — 135 by our initial count — producing a relatively standardized product and
using largely the same, simple production process. The technology we focus on is applicable at
a large enough number of firms to conduct statistical inference.
The second, and perhaps more important, advantage is that our research team, through a
series of fortuitous events, discovered a useful innovation: we invented a new technology that
represents, we argue, an unambiguous increase in technical efficiency for nearly all firms in the
sector. The most common soccer-ball design combines 20 hexagonal and 12 pentagonal panels
(see Figure 1). The panels are cut from rectangular sheets of an artificial leather called rexine,
typically by bringing a hydraulic press down on a hand-held metal die. Our new technology,
described in more detail below, is a die that increases the number of pentagons that can be cut
1For instance, in a well-cited review article, Geroski (2000) writes: “The central feature of most discussions
of technology diffusion is the apparently slow speed at which firms adopt new technologies” (p. 604). See also
Rosenberg (1982).
2See, for instance, Ryan and Gross (1943), Griliches (1957), Coleman and Menzel (1966), Foster and Rosen-
zweig (1995), and Conley and Udry (2010).
3See Mansfield (1961) and the summary in Table 2 of Mansfield (1989).
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from a rectangular sheet, by implementing the best packing of pentagons in a plane known to
mathematicians. A conservative estimate is that the new die reduces rexine costs for pentagons
by 6.25 percent and reduces total costs by approximately 1 percent — a modest reduction but
not an insignificant one in an industry where mean profit margins are 8 percent. The new
die requires minimal adjustments to other aspects of the production process. Importantly, we
observe adoption of the new die very accurately, in contrast to studies that infer technology
adoption from changes in residual-based measures of productivity such as those reviewed in
Syverson (2011).
We randomly allocated the new technology to a subset of 35 firms (which we refer to as the
“tech drop” group) in May 2012. To a second group of 18 firms (the “cash drop” group) we
gave cash equal to the value of the new die (US$300), and to a third group of 79 firms (the “no
drop” group) we gave nothing. We initially expected the technology to be adopted quickly by
the tech-drop firms, and we planned to focus on spillovers to the cash-drop and no-drop firms
and the channels through which they operate; we pursue this line of inquiry in a companion
paper (Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen, 2014). In the first 15 months
of the experiment, however, the most striking fact was how few firms had adopted, even among
the tech-drop group. As of August 2013, five firms from the tech-drop group and one from the
no-drop group had used the new die to produce more than 1,000 balls in the previous month, our
preferred measure of adoption. The experiences of the adopters indicated that the technology
was working as expected; we were reassured, for instance, by the fact that the one no-drop
adopter was one of the largest firms in the cluster, and had purchased a total of 32 dies on 9
separate occasions. Overall, however, adoption remained puzzlingly low.
In our April 2013 survey round, we asked non-adopters in the tech-drop group why they
had not adopted. Of a large number of possible responses, the leading answer was resistance
from cutters. Anecdotal evidence from a number of firms we visited suggested that workers were
resisting the new die, including by misinforming owners about the productivity benefit of the
die. We also noticed that the large adopter (purchaser of the 32 dies) differed from the norm
for other firms in its pay scheme: while more than 90 percent of firms pay a pure piece rate, it
pays a fixed monthly salary plus a performance bonus.
The qualitative evidence led us to hypothesize that a misalignment of incentives within the
firm is an important reason for the lack of adoption. The new die slows cutters down, certainly
in the initial period when they are learning how to use it, and possibly in the longer run
(although our data suggest that the long-run speed is nearly the same as for the existing die).
If cutters are paid a pure piece rate, their effective wage will fall in the short run. The new die
requires a slight modification to another stage of production, printing, and printers face a similar
but weaker disincentive to adopt. Unless owners modify the payment scheme, the benefits of
using the new technology accrue to owners and the costs are borne by the cutters and printers.
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Realizing this, the workers resist adoption. We formalize this intuition in a simple model of
strategic communication between an imperfectly informed principal and a perfectly informed
agent within a firm. When standard piece-rate contracts are used, there is an equilibrium
in which the agent misinforms the principal about the benefits of the new technology and the
principal is influenced by the agent not to adopt it. A relatively simple modification to the labor
contract, conditioning the wage contract on marginal cost, an ex-post-revealed characteristic of
the technology, induces the agent to truthfully reveal the technology and the principal to adopt
it.
To investigate the misalignment-of-incentives hypothesis, we designed and implemented a
new experiment. In September 2013, we randomly divided the set of 31 tech-drop firms that
were still in business into two groups, a treatment group (which we call the A group) and a
control group (the B group).4 To the B group, we simply gave a reminder about the benefits
of the die and an offer of another demonstration of the cutting pattern. To the A group, we
gave the reminder but also explained to the owner the issue of misaligned incentives and offered
an incentive-payment treatment: we offered to pay one cutter and one printer a lump-sum
bonus roughly equivalent to a monthly wage (US$150 and US$120, respectively), conditional
on demonstrating competence with the new technology (in the presence of the owner) within
one month. This bonus was designed to mimic (as closely as possible, given firms’ reluctance to
participate) the modified “conditional” wage contracts we model in the theory. The one-time
bonus payments were small relative both to revenues from soccer-ball sales for the firms, which
have a mean of approximately US$146,000 and a median of approximately US$58,000 per month,
and to the (variable) cost reductions from adopting of our technology, which we estimate to be
approximately US$1,740 per month at the mean or US$493 per month at the median.
The incentive-payment experiment was run on a total of 31 firms, 15 in group A and 16
in group B. Of the 13 group-A firms that had not already adopted the new die, 8 accepted
the incentive-payment intervention, and 5 subsequently adopted the new die. Of the 13 group
B firms that had not already adopted the new die, none subsequently adopted. Although the
sample size is small, the positive effect on adoption is statistically significant, with the probability
of adoption increasing by 0.32 from a baseline adoption rate of 0.16 in the most conservative
intent-to-treat specification. Our results remain significant when using permutation tests that
are robust to small sample sizes. The fact that such small payments had a significant effect
on adoption suggests that the misalignment of incentives is indeed an important barrier to
adoption in this setting. In contrast, we find no support for a related hypothesis, that our
incentive payment simply subsidized the fixed costs of adoption, since such a hypothesis cannot
plausibly generate the adoption rates we find.
4Of the original 35 tech-drop firms, 4 were no longer producing soccer balls as of August 2013 leaving 31
tech-drop firms for the new experiment.
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A natural question is why the firms themselves did not adjust their payment schemes to
incentivize their employees to adopt the technology. Our model suggests two possible explana-
tions. The first is that owners simply did not realize that such an alternative payment scheme
was possible, just as the technical innovation had not occurred to them. The second is that
there is some sort of transaction cost involved in changing payment schemes, a possibility that
we discuss in more detail in Section 6 below. Firms weigh the perceived benefits of the tech-
nology against the transaction cost; if they have a low prior that the technology is beneficial,
they may not be willing to pay the cost. The hypotheses that firms were unaware of the alter-
native payment scheme and that implementing a new scheme was perceived to be too costly to
be worthwhile have similar observable implications and we are not able to separate them with
our second experiment. What is clear, however, is that many firms did not in fact adjust the
payment scheme, and for that reason there was scope for our modest payment intervention to
have a positive effect on adoption.
In addition to the research cited above, our paper is related to several different strands of
literature. A number of papers have highlighted resistance to adopting new technologies in
manufacturing. Lazonick (1979) and Mokyr (1990) argue that guilds and trade unions slowed
implementation of new technologies during the industrial revolution; Desmet and Parente (forth-
coming) further suggest that this was due to small markets and lack of competition. Similarly,
Parente and Prescott (1999) argue that monopoly rights in factor supplies can explain low
levels of adoption. Historically, many cases are of resistance to labor-saving technologies that
could substitute for the labor of skilled artisans. Focusing on more recent periods, Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007, 2010) and the aforementioned Bloom et al. (2013) suggest that a lack of com-
petition may be responsible to the failure to adopt beneficial management practices. Another
literature emphasizes that new technologies often require changes in complementary technolo-
gies, which take time to implement (Rosenberg, 1982; David, 1990; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,
1995). In our setting, unions are absent, firms sell almost all output on international export
markets that appear to be quite competitive, and our technology is labor-using rather than
labor-saving and requires extremely modest changes to other aspects of production, so it does
not appear that the most common existing explanations are directly applicable. We view our
focus on intra-organizational barriers as complementary to these literatures.
The theoretical model we develop draws on ideas from two strands of theoretical research: the
literature on strategic communication following Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the voluminous
literature on principal-agent models of the employment relationship reviewed by Lazear and
Oyer (2013) and Gibbons and Roberts (2013). There is a smaller literature that combines
elements of the two strands, for instance Lazear (1986), Gibbons (1987), Dearden, Ickes, and
Samuelson (1990), Carmichael and MacLeod (2000), Dessein (2002) and Krishna and Morgan
(2008). Lazear (1986) and Gibbons (1987) formalize the argument that workers paid piece
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rates may hide information about productivity improvements from their employers, to prevent
employers from reducing rates. Carmichael and MacLeod (2000) explore the contexts in which
firms will commit to fixing piece rates in order to alleviate these “ratchet” effects. Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991) show that high-powered incentives such as piece rates may induce employees
to focus too much on the incentivized task to the detriment of other tasks, which could include
reporting accurately on the value of a technology. Our study supports the argument of Milgrom
and Roberts (1995) that piece rates may need to be combined with other incentives, in our case
higher pay conditional on adopting the new technology. In related empirical work, Freeman and
Kleiner (2005) provide case-study evidence from an American shoe company whose shift away
from piece rates arguably helped it to increase productivity.5
Our paper is related to an active literature on technology adoption in non-manufacturing
settings in developing countries. Much of this work has focused on agriculture, where clean
measures of technology use are more often available than in manufacturing (e.g. Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004), Bandiera and Rasul (2006), Conley and Udry (2010), Duflo,
Kremer, and Robinson (2011), Suri (2011), Hanna, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (forthcom-
ing), BenYishay and Mobarak (2014)). We believe that manufacturing firms are important in
their own right, as their decisions clearly matter for development and growth. They also raise
issues of organizational conflict that do not arise when the decision-makers are individual farm-
ers. In addition, risk arguably plays a less important role among manufacturing firms than in
many agricultural settings, both because there is a lower degree of production risk (which we
would expect to make the inference problem about the value of a technology easier) and because
factory owners are presumably less risk-averse than small-holder farmers. Also related are recent
papers on adoption of health technologies in the presence of externalities (Miguel and Kremer,
2004; Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2014) and on the effect of informational interventions on
change-holding behavior of Kenyan retail micro-enterprises (Beaman, Magruder, and Robinson,
2014). As with the literature on agriculture, in none of these settings does organizational conflict
play an important role.
Our paper is also related to a small but growing literature on field experiments in firms, in-
cluding the experiments with fruit-pickers by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005, 2007, 2009)
and the aforementioned study by Bloom et al. (2013) of the effect of management consulting
services on productivity in the Indian textile industry.6 In addition to emphasizing the lack of
competition, Bloom et al. suggest that “informational constraints” are an important factor lead-
ing firms not to adopt simple, apparently beneficial, elsewhere widespread, practices. Our study
5Descriptive evidence on intra-organizational conflicts over piece rates is provided by the classic studies of
Edwards (1979) and Clawson (1980). A recent experimental study by Khwaja, Olken, and Khan (2014) focuses
on a public bureaucracy in the Punjab property tax department, but focuses on a similar issue: the effect of
altering wage contracts on employee performance and resistance to reform.
6See Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2011) for a review of the literature on field experiments in firms.
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investigates how a conflict of interest within firms can impede the flow of information to man-
agers and provides a possible microeconomic rationale for the importance of such informational
constraints, and in this sense we view our work as complementary.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the Sialkot cluster.
Section 3 describes the new cutting technology. Section 4 describes our surveys and presents
summary statistics. Section 5 details the roll-out of the new technology and documents rates of
early adoption. Section 6 discusses qualitative evidence on organizational barriers and presents
our model of strategic communication in a principal-agent context. Section 7 describes the
incentive-payment experiment and evaluates the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Industry Background
Sialkot, Pakistan is a city of 1.6 million people in the province of Punjab. The origins of
the soccer-ball cluster date to British colonial rule.8 Soccer balls for British regiments were
imported from England, but given the long shipping times, there was growing need to produce
balls locally. In 1889, a British sergeant asked a Sialkoti saddle-maker to repair a damaged ball.
The saddle-maker’s new ball impressed the sergeant, who placed orders for more balls. The
industry subsequently expanded through spinoffs from the original firm and new entrants. By
the 1970s, the city was a center of offshore production for many European soccer-ball companies,
and in 1982, firms in Sialkot manufactured the balls used in the FIFA World Cup for the first
time.
Virtually all of Pakistan’s soccer ball production is concentrated in Sialkot and exported
to foreign markets. In recent years, the global market share of the cluster has been shrinking.
Considering U.S. imports (for which, conveniently, there is a 10-digit Harmonized System cat-
egory for inflatable soccer balls, 9506.62.40.80), Pakistan’s market share fell from a peak of 71
percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 2012. In contrast, China’s market share rose from 19 percent to
71 percent over the same period. (See Figure 2.) The firms in Sialkot face increasing pressure
from Chinese producers at both the high and low ends of the soccer ball market. At the low
end, China dominates production of lower-quality machine-stitched balls. At the high end, Chi-
nese firms manufacture the innovative thermo-molded balls that have been used in recent FIFA
World Cups (with the balls the 2014 FIFA World Cup being made in both China and Sialkot).
Sialkot still remains the major source for the world’s hand-stitched soccer balls; it provided, for
example, the hand-stitched balls used in the 2012 Olympic Games.
7In other related work on firms, Anderson and Newell (2004) study the effect of information from energy-
efficiency audits on U.S. firms’ adoption decisions in a non-experimental setting. The paper does not focus on
the role of organizational barriers. The “insider econometrics” literature reviewed by Ichniowski and Shaw (2013)
focuses on relationships between management practices and productivity, typically in a cross-sectional context.
8This summary of the history of the sector draws on an undated, self-published book by a member of a
soccer-ball-producing family (Sandal, undated).
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To the best of our knowledge, there were 135 manufacturing firms producing soccer balls in
Sialkot as of November 2011. The firms themselves employ approximately 12,000 workers, and
outsourced employment of stitchers in stitching centers and households is generally estimated
to be more than twice that number (Khan, Munir, and Willmott, 2007). The largest firms have
hundreds of employees (the 90th percentile of firm size among our sample is 225 employees)
and typically produce for large international sports brands such as Nike and Adidas as well as
under their own brands or for smaller country-specific brands. These firms manufacture both
high-quality “match” and medium-quality “training” balls, often with a sports brand or soccer
team’s logo, as well as lower quality “promotional” balls, often branded with an advertiser’s
logo. The remaining producers in our sample are small- and medium-size firms (the median firm
size is 16 employees) who typically produce promotional balls either for clients met at industry
fairs and online markets or under subcontract to larger firms.
3 The New Technology
3.1 Description
Before presenting our new technology, we first briefly explain the standard production process.
As mentioned above, most soccer balls (approximately 90 percent in our sample) are of a stan-
dard design combining 20 hexagons and 12 pentagons (see Figure 1), often referred to as the
“buckyball” design.9 There are four stages of production. In the first stage, shown in Figure
3, layers of cloth (cotton and/or polyester) are glued to an artificial leather called rexine using
a latex-based adhesive, to form what is called a laminated sheet. The rexine, cloth and latex
are the most expensive inputs to production, together accounting for approximately 46 percent
of the total cost of each soccer ball (or more if imported rexine, which is higher-quality, is used
instead of Pakistani rexine). In the second stage, shown in Figure 4, a skilled cutter uses a metal
die and a hydraulic press to cut the hexagonal and pentagonal panels from the laminated sheets.
The cutter positions the die on the laminated sheet by hand before activating the press with a
foot-pedal. He then slides the laminated sheet along and places the die again to make the next
cut.10 In the third stage, shown in Figure 5, logos or other insignia are printed on the panels.
This requires designing a “screen,” held in a wooden frame, that allows ink to pass through to
create the desired design. Typically the cutting process produces pairs of hexagons or pentagons
that are not completely detached; the die makes an indentation but leaves them attached to be
printed as a pair, using one swipe of ink. In the fourth stage, shown in Figure 6, the panels
are stitched together around an inflatable bladder. Unlike the previous three stages, this stage
9The buckyball resembles a geodesic dome designed by R. Buckminster Fuller.
10We use “he” since all of the cutters (as well as the printers and owners) we have encountered in the industry
have been men.
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is often outsourced, with stitching taking place at specialized stitching centers or in stitcher’s
homes. The production process is remarkably similar across the range of firms in Sialkot. A
few of the larger firms have automated the cutting process, cutting half-sheets or full sheets
of rexine at once, or attaching a die to a press that moves on its own, but even these firms
typically continue to do hand-cutting for a substantial share of their production. A few firms
in the cluster have implemented machine-stitching, but this has little effect on the first three
stages of production.
Prior to our study, the most commonly used dies cut two panels at a time, either two
hexagons or two pentagons, with the two panels sharing an entire edge (Figure 7). Hexagons
tessellate (i.e. completely cover a plane), and experienced cutters are able to cut with a small
amount of waste — approximately 8 percent of a laminated sheet, mostly around the edges. (See
the rexine “net” remaining after cutting hexagons in Figure 8.) Pentagons, by contrast, do not
tessellate, and using the traditional two-pentagon die even experienced cutters typically waste
20-24 percent of the laminated sheet (Figure 9). The leftover rexine has little value; typically it
is sold to brickmakers who burn it to fire their kilns.
In June 2011, as we were first exploring the possibility of studying the soccer-ball sector,
we sought out a consultant who could recommend a beneficial new technique or practice that
had not yet diffused in the industry. We found a Pakistan-based consultant who appears to
have been responsible for introducing the existing two-hexagon and two-pentagon dies many
years ago. (Previously firms had used single-panel dies.) We offered the consultant US$4,125
to develop a cost-saving innovation for us. The consultant spent several days in Sialkot but was
unable to improve on the existing technology. After this setback, a co-author on this project,
Eric Verhoogen, happened to watch a YouTube video of a Chinese firm producing the Adidas
“Jabulani” thermo-molded soccer ball used in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The video showed
an automated press cutting pentagons for an interior lining of the Jabulani ball using a pattern
different from the one we knew was being used in Sialkot (Figure 10). Based on the pattern
in the video, Verhoogen and his wife, Annalisa Guzzini, an architect, developed a blueprint for
a four-pentagon die (Figures 11 and 12). Through an intermediary, we then contracted with
a diemaker in Sialkot to produce the die (Figure 13). It was only after we had received the
first die and piloted it with a firm in Sialkot that we discovered that the cutting pattern is
well known to mathematicians. The pattern appeared in a 1990 paper in the journal Discrete
& Computational Geometry (Kuperberg and Kuperberg, 1990).11 It also appears, conveniently
enough, on the Wikipedia “Pentagon” page (Figure 14).12
11The cutting pattern represents the best known packing of regular pentagons into a plane. Kuperberg and
Kuperberg (1990) conjecture that the pattern represents the densest possible packing, but this is not a theorem.
12One might wonder whether firms in Sialkot also observed the production process in the Chinese firm producing
for Adidas, since it was so easy for us to do so. We found one owner, of one of the larger firms in Sialkot, who said
that he had been to China and observed the offset cutting pattern (illustrated in Figure 11) and was planning to
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The pentagons in the new die are offset, with the two leftmost pentagons sharing half an
edge, unlike in the traditional two-pentagon die in which the pentagons are flush, sharing an
entire edge. We refer to the new die as the “offset” die, and treat other dies with pentagons
sharing half an edge as variations on our technology. Note that a two-pentagon variant of our
design can easily be made using the specifications in the blueprint (with the two leftmost and
two rightmost pentagons in Figure 12 cut separately). As we discuss in more detail below, the
two-pentagon offset die is the one that has proven more popular with firms.
3.2 Benefits and costs
We now turn to a calculation of the benefits and costs of using the new offset die. In order to
quantify the various benefit and cost components we draw on several rounds of survey data that
we describe in more detail in Section 4 below.
3.2.1 Reductions in wastage
We start by comparing the number of pentagons using the traditional die with the number using
the offset die. The dimensions of pentagons and hexagons vary slightly across firms, even for
balls of a given official size (e.g. size 5, the standard size for adults). The most commonly used
pentagons have edge-length 43.5 mm, 43.75 mm, 44 mm or 44.25 mm after stitching. The first
two columns of Table 1 report the means and standard deviations of the numbers of pentagons
per sheet for each size, using a standard (39 in. by 54 in.) sheet of rexine. Column 1 uses
information from owner self-reports; we elicited the information in more than one round, and
here we pool observations across rounds. Column 2 uses information from direct observation
by our survey team, during the initial implementation of our first experiment. In order to
facilitate comparison across die sizes, we have multiplied each size-specific measure by the ratio
of means for size 44 mm and the corresponding size, and then averaged the rescaled measure
across sizes. The rescaled measure, reported in the row labeled “rescaled,” provides an estimate
of the number of pentagons per sheet the firm would obtain if it used a size 44 mm die. We
see that the owner reports and direct observations correspond reasonably closely, with owners
slightly overestimating pentagons per sheet relative to our observations. Both measures suggest
that cutters obtain approximately 250 pentagons per sheet using the traditional die.
Using the new offset die and cutting 44 mm pentagons, it is possible to achieve 272 pentagons,
implement it on a new large cutting press to cut half of a rexine sheet at once, a process known as “table cutting”.
As of May 2012, he had not yet implemented the new pattern, however, and he had not developed a hand-held
offset die. It is also important to note that two of the largest firms in Sialkot have not allowed us to see their
production processes. As these two firms are known to produce for Adidas, we suspect that they were aware of
the offset cutting pattern before we arrived. What is clear, however, is that neither the offset cutting pattern nor
the offset die were in any other firm we visited as of the beginning of our experiment in May 2012.
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as illustrated in Figure 11.13 For smaller 43.5 mm pentagons, it is possible to achieve 280
pentagons. Columns 3-4 of Table 1 report the means and standard deviations of pentagons per
sheet using the offset die. As discussed in more detail below, relatively few firms have adopted
the offset die, and therefore we have many fewer observations. But even keeping in mind this
caveat, we can say with a high level of confidence that more pentagons can be obtained per
sheet using the offset die. The directly observed mean is approximately 272, and the standard
errors indicate that difference from the mean for the traditional die (either owner reports or
direct observations) is significant at greater than the 99 percent level.
3.2.2 Cost savings from reduced wastage
In order to convert these reductions in wastage into cost savings we need to know the proportion
of costs that materials and cutting labor account for. Table 2 provides a cost breakdown for
a promotional ball obtained from our baseline survey.14 The table shows that the laminated
sheet (which combines the rexine and cotton/polyester cloth using the latex glue) accounts for
roughly half of the unit cost of production: 46 percent on average. The inflatable bladder is the
second most important material input, accounting for 21 percent of the unit cost. Labor of all
types accounts for 28 percent, but labor for cutting makes up less than 1 percent of the unit
cost. Overhead accounts for the remaining 5 percent of the cost of a ball. In the second column,
we report the input cost in rupees; the mean cost of a two-layer promotional ball is Rs 211.
(The exchange rate has varied from 90 Rs/US$ to 105 Rs/US$ over the period of the study. To
make calculations easy, we will use an exchange rate of 100 Rs/US$ hereafter.)
The cost savings from the offset die vary across firms, depending in part on the type of rexine
used and the number of layers of cloth glued to it, which themselves depend on a firm’s mix
of promotional balls and more expensive training balls. How long it takes firms to recoup the
fixed costs of adoption also varies across firms, depending on total production and the number
of cutters employed by the firm, in addition to the reduction in variable costs.15 In Table 3,
we present estimates of the distribution of the benefits and costs of adopting the offset die for
firms. Not all firms were willing to provide a cost breakdown by input in the baseline survey,
and only a subset of firms have adopted the offset die. In order to compute the distribution of
costs of benefits across all firms, we adopt a hot-deck imputation procedure that replaces a firm’s
missing value for a particular cost component with a draw from the empirical distribution within
13If a cutter reduces the margin between cuts, or if the rexine sheet is slightly larger than 39 in. by 54 in., it
is possible to cut more than 272 with a size 44 mm die.
14In the baseline survey, firms were asked for a cost breakdown of a size-5 promotional ball with two layers
(one cotton and one polyester), the rexine they most commonly use on a two-layer size-5 promotional ball, a
glue comprised of 50 percent latex and 50 percent chemical substitute (a cheaper alternative), and a 60-65 gram
inflatable latex bladder.
15Some firms have multiple cutters each of whom may require his own die.
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the firm’s stratum, and then compute the distribution of benefits.16 We repeat this procedure
1,000 times and report the mean values and standard deviations at various percentiles of the
distribution.
In row 1 of Table 3, we report the distribution of the percentage reduction in rexine waste
from the offset die. This is the product of (a) the percentage decline in rexine waste in cutting
pentagons from adopting the offset die, (b) the share of pentagons in total rexine costs (about
33 percent because a standard ball uses more hexagons than pentagons and each hexagon has a
larger surface area than each pentagon), and (c) the share of rexine in unit costs. The reduction
in rexine waste is 7.93 percent at the median and ranges from 4.39 percent at the 10th percentile
to 13.43 percent at the 90th percentile. Combining the reduction in rexine waste with the rexine
share of unit costs (which has the distribution is reported in row 2) and multiplying by 33 percent
yields the percentage reduction in variable material costs reported in row 3. The reduction in
variable material costs is 1.10 percent at the median and ranges from .60 percent at the 10th
percentile to 1.94 at the 90th percentile.17
The new die requires the cutters to be more careful in the placement of the die while cutting.
A conservative estimate of the increase in labor time for cutters is 50 percent. (Below we discuss
why this number is conservative.) The fourth row of Table 3 reports the distribution of the
cutter’s wage as a share of unit costs across firms. As noted earlier, the cutter’s share of cost
is quite low.18 Multiplying the cutter share by 33 percent (assuming that pentagons take up
one third of cutting time, equivalent to their share of rexine cost) and then by 50 percent (an
estimate of the increase in labor time) yields the percentage increase in variable labor costs from
adopting the offset die (row 5).
Although the proportional increase in cutting time is potentially large, the cutter’s share of
cost is sufficiently low that the variable labor cost increase is very small. Row 6 reports the net
variable cost reduction as the difference between the variable materials cost reduction and the
variable labor cost increase. The net variable cost reduction is 1.02 percent at the median, and
16As discussed below, firms were stratified according to total monthly output (measured in number of balls)
at baseline. One stratum, the late-responder sample we describe in detail below, did not respond to the baseline
survey. Because information on rexine shares were collected only at baseline, we draw rexine shares for late
responders from the empirical distribution that pools the other strata. (We do not pool for the other variables,
for which we have information on the late responders from later rounds.
17Note that because a firm at the 10th percentile of rexine waste reduction is not necessarily the same firm at
the 10th percentile of rexine as a share of cost, the numbers are not multiplicative across rows within a percentile.
Likewise, the mean of the variable material cost reduction is not multiplicative across rows because of potential
correlations between rexine as a share of costs and rexine waste reduction.
18The cutter wage as a share of costs reported here is lower than in Table 2. This is because Table 2 reports
input components as a share of the cost of a promotional ball. In Table 3, we explicitly account for firms’ product
mix across promotional and training/match balls. To get the firm’s average ball cost, we divide its reported
price of a promotional ball by one plus the reported promotional-ball profit margin. We perform the analogous
procedure for training balls, which are more expensive to make. We then construct the firm’s weighted-average
unit cost using its reported fraction of total production on promotional balls. The cutter share of cost is then
calculated as the per ball payment divided by this weighted-average unit cost.
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ranges from .52 percent at the 10th percentile to 1.87 percent at the 90th percentile. Although
these numbers are small in absolute terms, the cost reductions are not trivial given the low profit
margins in this competitive industry. Row 7 shows the ratio of the net variable cost reductions to
average profits;19 the mean and median ratios are 15.45 percent and 12.34 percent, respectively,
and the ratio ranges from 5.27 percent at the 10th percentile to 28.98 percent at the 90th
percentile.
If we multiply the net variable cost reduction by total monthly output, we obtain the total
monthly savings, in rupees, from adopting the offset die (row 8). The large variation in output
across firms induces a high degree of heterogeneity in total monthly cost savings. The mean and
median monthly cost savings are Rs 174,120 (US$1,741) and Rs 49,380 (US$493), respectively,
and savings range from Rs 4,460 (US$44) at the 10th percentile to Rs 475,010 (US$4,750) at
the 90th percentile.
3.2.3 Net benefits of adoption
These reductions in variable cost must be compared with the fixed costs of adopting the offset
die. There are a number of such costs, but they are modest in monetary terms. First, the firm
must purchase the die itself. We were charged Rs 30,000 (US$300) for a four-piece die; the
market price for a two-pentagon offset die is now about Rs 10,000 ($100). As we explain below,
we paid this fixed cost for the firms in the tech-drop group, to which we gave the new die initially.
Second, the existing screens used to print logos and branding on the panels must be re-designed
and re-made to match the offset pattern. Designers typically charge Rs 600 (US$6) for each
new design; for the minority of firms that do not have in-house screenmaking capabilities, a new
screen costs Rs 200 ($2) to buy from an outside screenmaker. We note that new screens must in
any case be made for any new order but we include them to be conservative. Third, some firms
use a hole-punching machine, a device that punches holes at the edges of panels to facilitate
sewing. These machines also use dies. It is always possible to use a single-pentagon punching
die, but there is a speed benefit to using a two-pentagon punching die in these machines. A
two-pentagon punching die that works with pentagons cut by the two-pentagon offset die costs
approximately Rs 10,000 (US$100). Adding together these three components, a conservative
estimate of total fixed costs is Rs 20,800 (US$208).
A common way for firms to make calculations about the desirability of adoption is to use a
rule of thumb (or “hurdle”) for the length of time required to recoup the fixed costs of adoption
(the “payback period”). Reviewing a variety of studies from the U.S. and U.K., Lefley (1996)
reports that the “hurdles” vary from 2-4 years, with the mean at approximately 3 years.20
19The firm’s profit margin is a weighted average of its reported profit margin on promotional and training balls
where the weights are the share of each ball type in total production.
20Using data from energy-efficiency audits in the U.S., Anderson and Newell (2004) infer that firms are using
hurdles of 1-2 years.
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The final two rows of Table 3 report the distribution of the number of days needed to recover
the fixed costs of adoption detailed above. For this calculation, it is important to account for the
fact that firms often have multiple cutters, each of whom may have his own pentagon die (and
potentially need a separate screen and punch). We divide monthly firm output by the number
of cutters to calculate output per cutter per month and hence the cost savings per cutter per
month. Dividing our conservative estimate of (per cutter) fixed costs by cost savings per cutter
gives the number of days needed to recoup the fixed costs, reported in row 9. The median firm
can recover all fixed costs within 37 days; the payback period ranges from 9 days at the 10th
percentile to 194 days at the 90th percentile (which corresponds to firms that produce very few
balls). The final row reports the distribution of days to recover fixed costs that exclude the cost
of purchasing the die; this row is relevant for the tech-drop firms, to which we gave dies at no
cost. In this scenario, the median days to recover fixed costs is only 19 days.
3.2.4 Advantages of the technology for studying adoption
The setting and our technology have a number of advantages for the purpose of studying adop-
tion. First, virtually all firms in the cluster cut hexagons and pentagons in the manner described
above, at least for some portion of their production. Second, it is straightforward to measure
whether firms are using the technology, either by observing the cutters directly or by inspecting
the discarded rexine nets. We have also obtained reports of sales of the offset dies from the six
diemakers operating in Sialkot. Third, as detailed above, the new die requires minimal changes
to other aspects of production. Fourth, the new technology is easy to disseminate. It can be ex-
plained and demonstrated in thirty minutes. Finally, from the cost calculations above, it seems
clear that the net benefits of the technology are positive for any firm expecting to produce more
than an extremely modest number of balls. In 75 percent of firms, the fixed costs of adoption
could be paid off in less then three months. For half of the firms, it would take less than 5
weeks. For the subset of firms to which we gave dies, the corresponding numbers are 5 weeks
and 3 weeks.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
Between September and November of 2011, we conducted a listing exercise of soccer-ball pro-
ducers within Sialkot. We found 157 producers that we believed were active in the sense that
they had produced soccer balls in the previous 12 months and cut their own laminated sheets.
Of the 157 firms on our initial list, we subsequently discovered that 22 were not active by our
definition. Of the remaining 135 firms, 3 served as pilot firms for testing our technology.
We carried out a baseline survey between January and April 2012. Of the 132 active non-
pilot firms, 85 answered the survey; we refer to them as the “initial responder” sample. The low
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response rate was in part due to negative experiences with previous surveyors.21 In subsequent
survey rounds our reputation in Sialkot improved and we were able to collect information from
an additional 31 of the 47 non-responding producers (the “late responder” sample), to bring
the total number of responders to 116. The baseline collected firm and owner characteristics,
standard performance variables (e.g. output, employment, prices, product mix and inputs) and
information about firms’ networks (supplier, family, employee and business networks). To date,
we have conducted seven subsequent survey rounds, in May-June 2012, July 2012, October
2012, January 2013, March-April 2013, September-November 2013 and January-March 2014.
The follow-up surveys have again collected information on the various performance measures as
well as information pertinent to the adoption of the new cutting technology.
Table 4 presents summary statistics on various firm characteristics, including means and
values at several quantiles. Panel A reports statistics for the sample of 85 baseline responders
and Panel B for the full sample that also includes the 31 late responders. Because the late
responders did not respond to the baseline, we have a smaller set of variables for the full sample.
As firms’ responses are often noisy, where possible we have taken within-firm averages across all
survey rounds for which we have responses (indicated by “avg. ...” at the beginning of variable
names in the table). Focusing on the initial-responder sample, a number of facts are worth
emphasizing. The median firm is medium-size (20 employees, producing 10,000 balls/month)
but there are also some vary large firms (maximum employment is 1,700, producing nearly
300,000 balls per month).22 Profit rates are generally low, approximately 8 percent at the
median and 12.5 percent at the 90th percentile. The corresponding firm size and profit margins
in the full sample (Panel B) are slightly larger indicating that the late responders are larger than
the initial responders. For most firms, all or nearly all of their production of size-5 balls uses the
standard “buckyball” design. The industry is relatively mature; the mean firm age is 25.4 years,
19.5 years at the median and 54 years at the 90th percentile. Finally, cutters tend to have high
tenure; the mean tenure in the current firm for a head cutter is approximately 11 years (9 years
at the median). One other salient fact is that the vast majority of firms pay pure piece rates to
their cutters and printers. Among the initial responders, 77 of 85 firms pay a piece rate to their
cutters, with the remainder paying a daily, weekly or monthly salary and possibly performance
bonuses.23 Table A.1 in the appendix shows how the same variables very across firm-size bins
for both the initial-responder and full samples.
21In 1995, there was a child-labor scandal in the industry in Sialkot. Firm owners were initially quite distrustful
of us in part for that reason.
22The employment numbers understate the true size of the industry since the most labor intensive stage of
production, stitching, is almost exclusively done outside of the firm in stitching centers or homes.
23In a later survey round, we also found that more than 90 percent of firms pay their printers a piece rate.
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5 Experiment 1: The Technology-Drop Experiment
In this section we briefly describe our first experiment, the technology-drop experiment. Addi-
tional details are provided in Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen (2014),
which focuses on spillovers in technology adoption. For the purposes of the current paper, the
first experiment mainly serves to provide evidence of low adoption, a puzzle we investigate using
the second experimental intervention motivated in Section 6 and described in Section 7.
5.1 Experimental design
The 85 firms in the initial-responder sample were divided into four strata based on quartiles
of the number of balls produced in a normal month from the baseline survey. Within these
strata firms were randomly assigned to one of three groups: the tech-drop group, the cash-
drop group, and the no-drop group. We included the cash-drop group in order to shed light
on the possible role of credit constraints in the technology-adoption decision.24 The top panel
of Table 5 summarizes the distribution of firms across groups for the initial-responder sample.
Approximately 27 percent of firms were assigned to the tech-drop group and 13.5 percent to the
cash-drop group.25 These allocations were chosen with the aim of ensuring we had a sufficient
number of firms outside the tech-drop group to examine the channels through which spillovers
occur. In addition, because we were interested in tracking all firms in the cluster, we treated
initial non-responders as a separate stratum and divided them into three groups using the same
proportions as for the initial responders. Of the initial non-responders, 22 were revealed not
to be active firms. Of the remaining 47 firms, 31 eventually responded to at least one of our
survey rounds; these are the “late responders” included in the full sample discussed in Section 4.
The bottom panel of Table 5 summarizes the response rates for the initial non-responders. It is
important to note that response rates of the active initial non-responders are clearly correlated
with treatment assignment: firms assigned to the tech-drop and cash-drop groups (to which
we were giving the new die or cash, as described below) were more likely to respond than
firms assigned to the no-drop group. For this reason, when it is important that assignment
to treatment in the tech-drop experiment be exogenous, we will focus on the initial-responder
sample. In our second experiment, where we focus only on active tech-drop firms, all of which
24In an experiment with micro-enterprises in Sri Lanka, de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) find very high
returns — higher than going interest rates — to drops of cash or capital of roughly similar magnitudes (US$100
or US$200), suggesting that the micro-enterprises operate under credit constraints. Although our prior was that
the US$300 value of the new die would matter less to the larger firms in our sample, we chose to include the
cash-drop component in order to be able to separate the effect of the shock to capital from the effect of knowledge
about the technology.
25There were 88 firms with 22 in each stratum at the moment of assignment. In each stratum, 6 firms were
assigned to the tech-drop group, 3 to cash-drop group and 13 to the no-drop group. Three firms that responded
to our baseline survey subsequently either shut down or were revealed not to be firms by our definition, leaving
85 firms.
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responded, this distinction will be irrelevant.
We began the technology-drop experiment in May 2012. Firms assigned to the technology
group were provided with a four-pentagon offset die, along with a blueprint that could be used
to modify the die (combining Figures 11 and 12). Additionally, these firms were given a thirty-
minute demonstration of the cutting pattern for the new die. The die we provided cuts pentagons
with edge-length of 44 mm. As noted in Section 3 above, firms often use slightly different size
dies, and the pentagon die size must match the hexagon die size. For this reason, we also offered
firms a free trade-in: we offered to replace the die we gave them with an offset die of a different
size, produced at a local diemaker of their choice. Firms were also able to trade in their die for
a two-panel version of the offset die of the same size. Of the 35 tech-drop firms, 19 took up
the trade-in offer. All of these chose to trade in for the two-panel version of the offset die. The
two-panel version is easier to maneuver with one hand and as a consequence the cutting rhythm
with the two-panel offset die is more similar to the rhythm using the two-panel traditional die.
The cash group was given cash equal to the price we paid for each four-pentagon offset die, Rs
30,000 (US$300), but no information about the new die. Firms in the no-drop group were given
nothing.
To examine baseline balance, Panel A of Table 6 reports the mean of various firm charac-
teristics across the tech-drop, cash-drop and no-drop groups for the initial-responder sample.
We find no significant differences across groups.26 It appears that the randomization gener-
ated exogenous variation in initial exposure among the initial responders. Panel B of Table 6
reports the analog for the 31 late responders. Here we see significant differences for various
variables, consistent with the observation above that response rates among the late responders
appear to have responded endogenously to treatment assignment. Caution is clearly warranted
in interpreting results that include the late responders.
5.2 Early adoption of the new technology
We have continued to monitor closely the technology use of all firms in the cluster, in addition
to other variables.27 In tech-drop group firms, we have explicitly asked about usage of the offset
die. For the other groups, we have sought to determine whether firms are using the offset die
without explicitly mentioning the offset die, through four methods. First, in our surveys we asked
whether the firm recently adopted any new technologies or production processes. If they reported
adopting a new cutting technology, we asked them to describe it further. Second, we asked for the
number of pentagons cut per sheet and queried further if these numbers had risen from previous
rounds. Third, our survey team was attentive to any mention of the offset die in the factory,
26On average, firms in the technology group employ fewer people than other firms, but the differences are not
statistically different at the 5 percent level.
27The timing of the survey rounds appears in Section 4.
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whether or not in the context of the formal survey. Fourth, we have maintained independent
contact with the six diemakers in Sialkot, who have agreed to provide us information on sales of
the offset die. Based on this information, we believe that we have complete knowledge of offset
dies purchased in Sialkot, even by firms that have never responded to any of our surveys. Any
firm who appears in the diemakers’ registers as having received an offset die was asked directly
about usage. If we had evidence that the firm adopted any variant of the offset die through
any of the four sources above, we asked additional questions to learn more details about the
adoption process and information flows pertaining to the die.
Table 7 reports adoption rates as of August 2013, 15 months after we introduced the tech-
nology, with the initial-responder sample in Panel A and the full sample in Panel B. The first
three rows of each panel indicate the number of firms that were both active and responded to
our surveys. The fourth row reports that a high proportion of tech-drop firms took up our offer
of a trade-in for a different die. The fifth and sixth rows report the number of firms that ordered
and that received dies (beyond the one trade-in offered to tech-drop firms). The numbers are
modest: in the full sample, one tech-drop firm and six no-drop firms made an additional order.
(One diemaker was slow in delivering dies and firms canceled their orders, hence the discrepancy
between the fifth and sixth rows).
In measuring adoption of the technology, we face a choice about whether to require that the
offset die was used in the production of some minimum number of balls and what bound to use.
Several firms reported that they had experimented with the die but had not actually used it
for a client’s order. To be conservative, we have chosen not to count such firms as adopters.
Our preferred measure of adoption requires that firms have produced at least 1,000 balls in
the previous month with the offset die. The measure is not particularly sensitive to the lower
bound; any bound above 100 balls would yield similar counts of adopters. Using our preferred
measure of adoption, the seventh and eighth rows of Table 7 report the number of firms who had
ever adopted the offset die and the number who were currently using the die in August 2013,
respectively.
In the full sample, there were five adopters in the tech-drop group and one in the no-drop
group as of August 2013.28 (In the initial-responder sample, the corresponding numbers are
four and zero.) These numbers struck us as small. Given the apparently clear advantages of
the technology discussed above, we were expecting much faster take-up among the firms in the
tech-drop group.
28Recall that only the technology group was provided with the technology, and so any adoption among the other
two groups constitutes a spillover. Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen (2014) investigates
spillovers and the channels through which they operate.
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5.3 Examining alternative explanations for low adoption
In this sub-section, we examine several standard hypotheses that may explain limited adoption
of the offset die as of Aug. 2013. We emphasize that this is primarily a descriptive exercise; we
are not placing a causal interpretation on the correlations we observe in the data. Additionally,
given the low rates of adoption, we have limited variation to work with.
In many previous studies of technological diffusion, the presumption has been that firms do
not adopt because they do not know about a technology. This is the assumption underlying
“epidemic” models of diffusion, one of the two main categories of diffusion models reviewed by
Geroski (2000). While lack of knowledge about the technology may explain the lack of take-up
in the cash-drop and no-drop groups,29 this cannot be the explanation for low adoption among
the tech-drop group, because we gave them the technology. We ourselves manipulated the firms’
information set.
Another natural hypothesis is simply that the technology does not reduce variable costs as
much as we have argued that it does. It is possible that there are unobserved problems with the
die that we were not aware of. Beyond our arguments about the mathematical superiority of our
cutting design and our cost-benefit breakdown, a key piece of evidence against this hypothesis
is the revealed preference of the six firms who adopted. In particular, the one adopter in the
no-drop group, which we refer to as Firm Z, is one of the largest firms in Sialkot. This firm
ordered 32 offset dies on 9 separate purchasing occasions between May 2012 and August 2013,
and has ordered more dies since then. Figure 15 plots the timing and quantity of its die orders.
In March-April 2013 (round 4 of our survey) the firm reported that it was using the offset
die for approximately 50 percent of its production, and has since reported that the share has
risen to 100 percent. The firm had abundant time to evaluate the efficacy of the offset die and
subsequently placed multiple additional orders. It would be hard to rationalize this behavior if
the offset die were not profitable for this firm.
A third hypothesis is that the fixed costs are larger than we have portrayed them to be. In
this scenario, fewer firms would find it profitable to adopt and the firms for which it would be
worth paying the fixed cost would be those that produce at a sufficient scale or who specialize in
higher quality balls. (Firms that produce higher quality balls use higher-quality imported rexine
and so may have stronger incentives to adopt since rexine accounts for a larger portion of their
unit costs.) To examine these hypotheses, Table 8 estimates a linear probability model relating
adoption to firm characteristics pertaining to scale and quality. Given the low levels of adoption,
we are unable to infer correlates of adoption with precision. That said, we find little evidence
that either scale or quality matters for the adoption decision. There is a marginally significant
relationship between output and adoption for non-tech-drop firms, but this is due entirely to
29We have collected information on knowledge flows between firms, and Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandel-
wal, and Verhoogen (2014) investigates them in more detail.
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the fact that the one non-tech drop adopter is a large firm. Within the tech-drop group, there
is no significant relationship between scale and adoption. Nor is the share of balls that use the
standard “buckyball” design (captured by the “share standard (of size 5)” variable) significantly
associated with adoption. The one quality-related variable that has a marginally significant
relationship with adoption, the price of size 5 training balls, has a negative coefficient, opposite
to what one would expect based on the hypothesis above. The only variable that appears to
be significantly associated with adoption is assignment to the tech-drop treatment in the first
place.
A fourth hypothesis is that firms differ in managerial talent, and that only talented managers
either identify the gains from the new technology or are able to implement the new technology in
an efficient way. A fifth, related hypothesis is that adoption depends on worker skill, especially of
the cutter. Table 9 reports results of linear models with several measures of manager and worker
characteristics as covariates. There is no significant relationship between manager education or
experience, age of the firm, head cutter experience, tenure, or score on a Raven’s IQ-type test.
There is also no significant relationship with whether cutters are paid piece rate or the level of
piece rate. The one variable that appears marginally significant is the number of pentagons per
sheet achieved with the traditional die (rescaled as in Table 1 discussed above), which can be
interpreted as a direct measure of the skill of the cutter. But this variable is not robust to the
simultaneous inclusion of other firm characteristics in Column 11.
Given the small number of adopters as of August 2013, it is perhaps not surprising that we
have not found robust correlations with firm characteristics. But we do interpret the results of
this sub-section as deepening the mystery of why so few firms adopted the new die.
6 Organizational Barriers to Adoption: Motivation and Model
6.1 Qualitative evidence
Puzzled by the lack of adoption, in the March-April 2013 survey round we added a question ask-
ing tech-drop group firms to rank the reasons for why they had not adopted the new technology,
providing nine options (including an “other” category).30 Table 10 reports the responses for the
18 tech-drop firms that responded. Ten of the 18 firms reported that their primary reason for
not adopting was that their “cutters are unwilling to work with the offset die.” Four of the 18
30The question asked respondents to “select the main reason(s) why you are not currently using an offset die.
If more than one, please rank those that apply in order.” The 9 categories were: (1) I have not had any orders to
try out the offset die. (2) I have been too busy to implement a new technology. (3) I do not think the offset die
will be profitable to use. (4) I am waiting for other firms to adopt first to prove the potential of the technology.
(5) I am waiting for other firms to adopt first to iron out any issues with the new technology. (6) The cutters are
unwilling to work with the offset die. (7) I have had problems adapting the printing process to match the offset
patterns. (8) There are problems adapting other parts of the production process (excluding printing or cutting
problems) (9) Other [fill in reason].
20
said that their primary problem related to “problems adapting the printing process to match
the offset patterns” and five more firms selected this as the second-most important barrier to
adoption. This issue may be related to the technical problem of re-designing printing screens,
but as noted above the cost of a new screen from an outside designer is approximately US$6. It
seems likely that the printing problems were related to resistance from the printers. (The other
popular response to the question, to which most firms gave lower priority, was that the firm had
received insufficient orders, consistent with the scale hypothesis above.)
The responses to the survey question were consistent with anecdotal reports from several
firms. One notable piece of evidence is from the firm we have called Firm Z, the large adopter
from the no-drop group. As noted above, more than 90 percent of firms in Sialkot pay piece
rates to their cutters. Firm Z is an exception: in part because of pressure from an international
client, for several years the firm has instead paid a guaranteed monthly salary supplemented
by a performance bonus, to guarantee that all workers earn at least the legal minimum wage
in Pakistan. While we do not find a statistically significant relationship on average between
whether a firm pays a piece rate and adoption (see Table 9), we view the fact that this large
early adopter uses an uncommon pay scheme as suggestive.
We also feel that it is useful to quote at some length from reports to us from our own survey
team.31 To be clear, the following reports are from factory visits during the second experiment,
which is described in Section 7 below, and we are distorting the chronology of events by reporting
them here. But we feel that they are useful to capture the flavor of the owner-cutter interactions
that we seek to capture in the theoretical model. As mentioned above and described in more
detail below, in our second experiment we offered one cutter in each firm (conditional on the
approval of the owner) a lump-sum US$150 (15,000 Rupees, denoted PKR) incentive payment
to demonstrate competence in using the offset die.32 The following excerpts are all from firms
in the group assigned to treatment for the second experiment (Group A).
In one firm, the owner told the survey team that he was willing to participate in the exper-
iment but that the team should ask the cutter whether he wanted to participate. The report
continues:
[The cutter] explained that the owner will not compensate him for the extra panels
he will get out of each sheet. He said that the incentive offer of PKR 15,000 is not
worth all the tensions in future.
It appears in this case that the cutter is seeking to withhold information about the new die in
order to avoid a future decline in the effective wage. The firm was not treated.
31The team included our research assistant, Tariq Raza, who wrote the reports, and the staff of the RCONS:
Research Consultants survey firm.
32We also offered one printer per firm an incentive payment of US$120, as described below.
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In another firm, the owner, who had agreed to participate in the treatment, was skeptical
when the enumerators returned to test the competence of the cutter with the new technology.
Our survey team writes,
[The owner] told us that the firm is getting only 2 to 4 extra pentagon panels by
using our offset panel... The owner thinks that the cost savings are not large enough
to adopt the offset die... He allowed us to time the cutter.
The team then continued to the cutting room without the owner.
On entering the cutting area, we saw the cutter practicing with our offset die... We
tested the cutter... He got 279 pentagon pieces in 2 minutes 32 seconds... The cutter
privately told us that he can get 10 to 12 pieces extra by using our offset die.
The owner then arrived in the cutting area.
We informed the owner about the cutter’s performance. The owner asked the cutter
how many more pieces he can get by using the offset die. The cutter replied, “only
2 to 4 extra panels.”
It appears that the cutter had been misinforming the owner. But the cutter was not willing to
risk dissembling in the cutting process itself.
The owner asked the cutter to cut a sheet in front of him. The cutter got 275 pieces
in 2 minutes 25 seconds. The owner looked satisfied by the cutter’s speed... The
owner requested us to experiment with volleyball dies.
This firm subsequently adopted the offset die.
In a third firm, the owner reported that he had modified the wage he pays to his cutter to
make up for the slower speed of the new die. Our team writes,
[The owner] said that it takes 1 hour for his cutter to cut 25 sheets with the conven-
tional die. With the offset die it takes his cutter 15 mins more to cut 25 sheets for
which he pays him pkr 100 extra for the day which is not a big deal.
This firm has generally not been cooperative in our survey, and we have not been able to verify
that the firm has produced more than 1,000 balls with the offset die, and for this reason is
not classified as an adopter. But we suspect that it will be revealed to be an adopter by our
definition in a future survey round.33
33Our survey team’s report continues,
He told us that his business is worth pkr 40 million. By giving him just pkr 4000 worth of die, we
are trying to get a lot of information out of him which he doesn’t like to give. He said that we are
lucky because our offset die really works (give[s] better results); that’s why he got trapped. Else he
wouldn’t have responded to us at all.
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6.2 A model of organizational barriers to adoption
The survey results and anecdotes point to misaligned incentives within the firm an explanation
for limited technology adoption. If firms pay piece rates and do not modify the payment scheme
when adopting, owners enjoy the gains from reduced input costs, but cutters — and to a lesser
extent printers — bear the costs of increased labor time. While the reduction in input costs are
an order of magnitude greater than the increase in labor costs, workers’ incomes may nonetheless
decline substantially, certainly during the initial phase of learning to use the new die and possibly
in the longer run. If the payment scheme remains unchanged, workers have an incentive to
misinform the owner about the value of the technology. The interesting question is why owners
are influenced by the misinformation from workers, given that they are presumably aware that
workers have such an incentive.
We now develop a cheap-talk model in a principal-agent setting that captures these intra-firm
dynamics and motivates our second experiment. The model is designed to be as simple as possible
but still to capture what we believe are the main forces at play. Specifically, it shows that under
certain parameter values there exists a scenario in which a perfectly informed cutter, acting
rationally, misinforms an imperfectly informed owner about the value of a beneficial technology
and the owner, also acting rationally, does not adopt. We then describe an organizational
innovation, a small expansion of the contract space, that can alleviate the misaligned-incentives
problem and that maps closely into the incentive-payment experiment described below.
As discussed in the introduction, our model combines insights from the literatures on strategic
communication (e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982)) and contracting within the firm (e.g. Gibbons
(1987) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)). We view the model primarily as an application of
ideas from these literatures to our setting.
6.2.1 Set-up
Consider a one-period game. There is a principal (she) and an agent (he). The principal can
sell output at a price p. The principal incurs two costs: a constant marginal cost of materials
C(q) = cq and a wage w(q) that she pays to the agent. The principal’s payoff is therefore
given by pq − w(q) − cq. The agent produces output q = sa where s is the productivity of the
technology (e.g. the cuts per minute or speed), and a is effort, which is not contractible. The
agent expends effort at a cost of e(a) = a
2
2 and has utility U = w(q)−
a2
2 .
There is a new technology. Adopting the new technology requires a fixed cost, F . The new
technology potentially affects the agent’s speed, s, and the materials cost, c. The old technology
has known parameters (s0, c0). The new technology can be one of three possible types:
1. Type 1 has parameters (c1, s1), with c1 = c0 and s1 < s0. This technology is dominated
by the existing technology because it does not lower material costs and is slower. We refer
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to this as the “bad” technology.
2. Type 2 has parameters (c2, s2), with c2 < c0 and s2 < s0. This technology lowers material
costs but is slower than the existing technology. This technology is analogous to our new
die.
3. Type 3 has parameters (c3, s3), with c3 = c0 and s3 > s0. This technology dominates the
existing technology because it has the same material costs but is faster.
The principal has prior ρi that the technology is type i, with
∑3
1 ρi = 1. We assume that the
agent knows the type of technology with certainty. We believe that this assumption is reasonable
since, as shown through the anecdotes, the cutters seem to be more knowledgeable about the
efficacy of a cutting technology than owners with less specialized expertise.
We assume that contracts must be of the linear form w(q) = α + βq, where β > 0. We
further assume that the agent has limited liability, α ≥ 0 — a reasonable assumption given that
no worker in our setting pays an owner to work in the factory. Below we will consider cases
which differ in the ability of the principal to condition the piece rate, β, on marginal cost, c, a
characteristic of the technology that will in general only be revealed ex post.
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the principal chooses a wage contract.34
In Stage 2, Nature reveals the technology type to the agent. In Stage 3, the agent can send one
of three costless messages, {m1,m2,m3} , regarding the type of the new technology. In Stage 4,
the principal decides whether or not to adopt the new technology, given the agent’s message. In
Stage 5 the profits and payments are realized and the technology is revealed to the principal.
The key feature of the timing is that the wage contract must be chosen before the characteristics
of the technology are signaled by the agent.35
6.2.2 Benchmark cases
As preliminary steps, it is useful to solve the model in two benchmark cases, one in which the
principal is fully informed about the technology and one in which the principal is imperfectly
informed and receives no signal from the agent.
Benchmark 1: Fully informed principal
In this case, the fully informed principal optimizes profits subject to the agent’s participation
34We restrict attention to a single contract rather than a menu of contracts since there was no evidence such
menus were on offer in Sialkot.
35Since Nature does not reveal the technology type to the principal, it is not crucial for the analysis whether
Nature’s move, which we can think of as the initial technology drop by our survey team, happens before or
after the wage contract is set. (That is, the order of Stages 1 and 2 can be reversed.) Thus the model can also
accommodate a scenario in which the principal’s priors are set when our survey team does the technology drop
and the technology type is revealed to the agent.
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constraint (PC); the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), i.e. that the agent chooses effort
optimally; and the limited liability constraint (LLC), α ≥ 0. Conditional on having adopted a
technology of type i, the principal’s problem is:
max
a,β
psia− (α+ βsia)− cisia s.t.
α+ βsia− a
2
2 ≥ 0 (PC)
arg maxa α+ βsia− a
2
2 = a (ICC)
α ≥ 0 (LLC)
where we have assumed that the agent’s outside option is zero. The optimal effort choice for
the agent is a = βsi. As is well known, in the absence of the limited-liability constraint the
principal would make the agent the residual claimant: she would set β = p − ci and bring the
agent down to his reservation utility through a negative value of α. With the limited-liability
constraint this is not possible. Since the agent’s effort is independent of α, the principal will
set α = 0. Given the agent’s effort choice, the optimal contract for the principal, for a known
technology i, is:




Note that the optimal piece rate depends on marginal cost. Since c1 = c3 = c0, the optimal
piece rate for technologies 1 and 3 is the same as under the existing technology. The optimal
piece rate for the material-saving technology, technology 2, is higher since c2 < c0. In this case,
the principal wants to incentivize more effort from the agent because profits per cut are higher.
It will be convenient below to write the principal’s profit from adopting technology i, given
the agent’s effort choice, as a function of piece rate β (which need not be optimal):
πi(β) = s
2
iβ (p− β − ci)− F · 1(i = 1, 2, 3) (2)
Benchmark 2: Imperfectly informed principal, no signaling from agent
In this case, the imperfectly informed principal must base her decision solely on her priors
about the technology type. Following the same logic as above, it can be shown that the principal
chooses the wage contract:











. The optimal piece rate is a weighted average of the














6.2.3 Imperfectly informed principal, with signaling from agent
We now turn to the setting of primary interest in which the principal is imperfectly informed
and can receive messages from the agent about the type of the new technology. We consider two
cases, one in which the principal cannot condition the wage payment on marginal cost, which is
only revealed ex post, and one in which she can, subject to a fixed transaction cost.
As noted above, the aim of the model is to capture the intra-organizational dynamics we have
observed, in particular that workers may misinform owners about the value of the technology,
discouraging adoption, and that a simple modification of wage contracts can lead to successful
adoption. These features are not present under all possible parameter values. In order to focus
attention on what we consider to be the interesting case in the model, we impose three parameter
restrictions. Using the definitions of βi from (1), of π(·) from (2), and of π̃(β̃) from (4), the
restrictions can be stated as follows:
π2(β0) > π0(β0) (5a)
π3(β2) > π0(β2) (5b)
π0(β0) > π̃(β̃) (5c)
The motivation for these conditions will be clearer below, but let us explain briefly here. Condi-
tion (5a) requires that type 2 be more profitable for the firm than the existing technology even
under the optimal piece rate for the existing technology (which is not optimal for type 2). This
in turn implies π2(β2) > π0(β0), i.e. a fully informed principal would adopt type 2. Condition
(5b) implies that technology 3 dominates the existing technology even at the optimal piece rate
for technology 2. This in turn implies π3(β3) > π0(β0), i.e. a fully informed principal would
adopt type 3.36 Condition (5c) requires that a principal with no information beyond her priors
would choose not to adopt.
No conditional contracts
First we consider the case in which the principal in Stage 1 is unable to condition the wage
contract on marginal cost. In this case, there is an equilibrium in which, if the technology is
type 2, the agent misinforms the principal about it and the principal does not adopt.
36From (2), the derivative of π3(β)− π0(β) is weakly negative over the range β ∈ [β0, β2].
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Proposition 1. In the game described above (without conditional contracts), the following set
of strategies is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1. Agent’s strategy:
(a) If the technology is type 1 or type 2, signal m1
(b) If the technology is type 3, signal m3.
2. Principal’s strategy:
(a) Offer wage contract
(
α∗ = 0, β∗ = p−c02
)
(b) If agent signals m2 or m3, adopt.
(c) If agent signals m1, do not adopt.
The formal proof is in appendix A.2. In this case the principal must commit in Stage 1 to
a particular piece rate not conditioned on cost. Given that she has done so, the agent strictly
prefers the existing technology to type 2. So if the technology is type 2, the agent signals that
it is type 1, the bad technology, to discourage adoption. Why does the principal pay attention
to the agent’s signal, given that she knows that the agent has the incentive to misinform her in
this way? The general answer is the agent’s signal may be “influential” in the sense discussed
by Sobel (2013) when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the agent’s and principal’s interests
are sufficiently aligned that for some technology types the agent and principal favor the same
adoption decision, and (2) the agent’s preferences over adoption vary across technology types.
These conditions are satisfied here: the players’ interests are aligned if the technology is of type
1 or 3, and the agent’s preferences for adoption differ across these types. The agent’s advice
is valuable enough in these states of the world that it is worthwhile for the principal to follow
the agent’s advice and allow herself to be misled in the type-2 state rather than to ignore the
agent’s advice altogether.
There is also a “babbling” equilibrium in which the principal ignores what the agent says
and the agent can say anything he pleases. In this equilibrium, the principal bases her decision
solely on her priors, as in Benchmark 2 above. Given condition (5c), she does not adopt. As in
other cheap-talk models, there are many other possible equilibria. The literature has developed
a number of equilibrium refinements to eliminate implausible equilibria, which are not our focus
here; see Sobel (2013) for further discussion.
An important question that arises here is whether there exists an equilibrium in which the
agent reveals the technology type truthfully. It turns out that under conditions (5a)-(5c) there
does not.
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Proposition 2. In the game described above, there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium under
which the agent always truthfully reveals the technology type.
The formal proof is in Appendix A.3. Intuitively, if the agent were to reveal the technology
type truthfully, then under our conditions the principal would want to adopt type 2 and not
type 1. But given this strategy of the principal, and the fact that the wage contract is fixed ex
ante, the agent would be better off misreporting type 2 to be type 1, discouraging adoption.
Conditional contracts
Now suppose that the principal can pay a fixed transaction cost, G, and have access to a
larger set of wage contracts, in particular to contracts that condition the piece rate on marginal
cost, c. Recall that the optimal contracts under the existing technology and types 1 and 3 are
identical (since c3 = c1 = c0 and hence β3 = β1 = β0). The ability to condition on marginal cost
is useful only for technology type 2. Allowing for conditioning, the principal can offer contracts
of the form:
w(q) = α+ (β + γ)q if c = c2 (6)
w(q) = α+ βq if c 6= c2
It turns out that if G is sufficiently small, then there will exist an equilibrium in which the agent
reveals truthfully.
Proposition 3. In the game described above (with conditional contracts), if
G < ρ2 [π2(β2)− π0(β0)] (7)
then the following set of strategies is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1. Agent’s strategy:
(a) If the principal pays G, signal truthfully.
(b) If the principal does not pay G:
i. If the technology is of type 1 or 2, signal m1.
ii. If the technology is of type 3, signal m3.
2. Principal’s strategy:
(a) Pay G and offer wage contract
(
α∗∗ = 0, β∗∗ = p−c02 , γ
∗∗ = c0−c22
)
(b) If the agent signals m1, do not adopt.
(c) If the agent signals m2 or m3, adopt.
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The proof is in Appendix A.4. Intuitively, if the principal offers the conditional contract, the
higher piece rate if c = c2 is enough to induce the agent to prefer adoption if the technology is of
type 2.37 Paying the fixed cost, G, will be in the interest of the principal if (7) is satisfied, which
is to say that the expected additional profit from adopting type 2 (with the optimal piece rate
for type 2) is greater than the fixed cost of gaining access to the new contract. In this case, the
availability of the conditional contract solves the misinformation problem, in that type 2 will be
adopted in equilibrium. At the same time, if the fixed cost G is high (i.e. if (7) is not satisfied),
then there again exists the equilibrium of Proposition 1, in which type 2 is not adopted. It is
worth emphasizing that condition (7) is a statement about the costs of contract modification
relative to the expected additional profit from adopting the type-2 technology, which depends
on the principal’s prior that the technology is of type 2, ρ2. If the principal is initially very
skeptical, she may not be willing to offer the conditional contract even at a very modest fixed
cost.
6.2.4 Discussion
The theory so far carries three main implications. First, under piece-rate contracts that cannot
be conditioned on marginal cost, there is an equilibrium in which cutters misinform owners about
the value of our technology and owners fail to adopt it. Second, again under non-conditioned
contracts, some information that the cutters have about technologies is necessarily lost because
of conflicting incentives within firms. Third, if the transaction cost of changing contracts is
sufficiently low, an expansion of the contract space to allow piece rates to be conditioned on
marginal cost (an ex-post-revealed characteristic of the technology) leads to truthful revelation
by the cutter and adoption by the owner.
A natural question that arises in this environment is why, if the simple contract modification
can solve the misinformation problem, owners would not simply offer the conditional contracts
on their own. Our model suggests two possible reasons, which we believe apply in the real-world
context. One reason, corresponding to the no-conditional-contracts case, is simply that the
principal is unaware of the existence of the conditional contract. In this sense, the conditional
contract may be an organizational innovation that was previously unknown, at least to some
firms, in the same way that our offset die and cutting design was previously unknown.
Another reason, corresponding to the conditional-contracts case, is that the principal is aware
of the conditional contract, but perceives the cost of implementing the conditional contract to
be higher than the expected benefit. The fixed transaction cost of offering the new contract can
be interpreted in a number of different ways. It may be that social norms have arisen around
standard piece-rate contracts, such that firms incur a cost in terms of reduced worker morale
37Note that, using the notation of (1), β∗∗ = β0 and β
∗∗ + γ∗∗ = β2, the optimal piece rate for type 2 in the
full-information case.
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if they deviate from the contract perceived to be normal or fair. The fixed cost can also be
interpreted as a cost of accessing a commitment device to make credible the principal’s pledge
to raise the piece rate if the technology is type 2. Although the principal may promise to alter the
piece rate in this way, such a promise is unlikely to hold up in a court, particularly in a setting
with relatively weak legal institutions such as Sialkot, and committing credibly to modifying
the piece rate may be quite costly. In our simple model, such commitment would not be needed
since the firm would want to pay the higher piece rate ex post, but such a commitment device
might be needed in more complicated models.
Finally, the fixed cost can be interpreted in light of the well-known ratchet effect (e.g. Gib-
bons (1987)). If a worker paid a piece rate discovers a labor-saving innovation, he may not bring
these to the attention of the owner if he expects the principal to cut the piece rate in response.
As in the Lincoln Electric case discussed in Carmichael and MacLeod (2000), it may be optimal
for the principal to commit to not changing the piece rate in order to encourage labor-saving
innovations. If most innovations in Sialkot are labor-saving, such concerns may explain why
piece rates are sticky and why it may be costly for firms to start offering conditional contracts
— contracts that open the door to the ratchet effect. Anecdotally, several firms and die-makers
reported to us that the last major cutting innovation was a shift from a one-pentagon die to the
two-pentagon non-offset die (e.g. two pentagons sharing a full edge, see Figure 7), which was a
labor-saving innovation. It seems plausible that firms in Sialkot expect new cutting technologies
to be labor- rather than material-saving and that they are reluctant to modify piece rates for
this reason.
These two possible explanations for the stickiness of labor contracts — that owners are not
aware of the existence of conditional contracts, and that they do not perceive the benefits of such
contracts to outweigh the costs of adopting them — have similar implications for the players’
behavior. The misinformation equilibrium exists in both circumstances. The key point is that,
for whatever reason, many owners did not in fact adjust labor contracts. This in turn left scope
for our incentive intervention, described below, to have an effect.
6.2.5 Theoretical Prediction for Incentive Intervention
Testing our theory empirically presents a number of practical challenges. In principle, one
approach would be to pay the transaction cost, G, and examine whether firms change the labor
contract and adopt the technology as predicted. But this transaction cost, while well defined
in the theory, is not observable and depends on various dimensions of complex social dynamics
within firms. It is not clear how much we (as experimenters) would pay, or to whom. Another
approach would be to offer the new, conditional piece rate ourselves. That is, we could offer
an additional payment per piece to the workers (corresponding to γ in (6)). The practical issue
here is that the firms are reluctant to share the detailed production information that would
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be required to implement such an piece-rate payment. Our challenges in collecting information
from firms in the earlier survey rounds indicated to us that it would be impossible to manipulate
the piece rate directly in our second experiment.38
Facing these constraints, we opted for a third approach: we offered a one-time lump-sum
payment to one cutter and one printer per firm, conditional on successful adoption of the new
offset die. We discuss the implementation in detail in Section 7 below; here we show conceptually
what effect we expect such a conditional incentive payment to have. The key point is that the
payment is still expected to solve the misinformation problem in the sense that, if it is sufficiently
large, it will induce the cutter to reveal truthfully the efficacy of the new technology.
Formally, suppose that the game is as described in Proposition 3 with two further mod-
ifications. First, assume that condition (7) is not satisfied. Second, assume that in Stage 2
a third-party experimenter may offer to modify the labor contract through the addition of an
incentive payment and that the principal places a zero prior on this possibility. Then we have
the following:
Proposition 4. In the game described above, suppose that in Stage 2 an experimenter offers an
incentive payment L to the agent if the marginal cost is revealed to be c2. If
L >
(p− c0)2(s20 − s22)
8
(8)
then the following set of strategies is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1. Agent’s strategy:
(a) If the experimenter offers incentive payment L, signal truthfully.
(b) If the experimenter does not offer incentive payment L:
i. If the technology is of type 1 or 2, signal m1.
ii. If the technology is of type 3, signal m3.
2. Principal’s strategy:
(a) Offer wage contract
(
α∗ = 0, β∗ = p−c02
)
(b) If the agent signals m1, do not adopt.
(c) If the agent signals m2 or m3, adopt.
38In the end, one-third of firms chose not to participate in the much less invasive intervention we decided to
implement; see Section 7 below for details. This confirmed our earlier belief that firms’ willingness to participate
would be limited.
31
The proof is in Appendix A.5. Intuitively, here the incentive payment, L, plays the same role
as the conditional piece rate γ∗∗ in Proposition 3: it raises the payoff to the agent of signaling
truthfully when the technology is of type 2. The empirical implication is simply that if the lump-
sum bonus is sufficiently large it will induce adoption of technology type 2. It is worth noting
that “sufficiently large” in this context is relative to the possible wage losses of a single cutter,
not to the revenues or profits of a firm. Indeed, we will see below that a lump-sum incentive
payment that appears small from the point of view of firms has a large effect on adoption,
consistent with this proposition.
7 Experiment 2: The Incentive-Payment Experiment
7.1 Experimental design
Motivated by the hypotheses described in the previous section, we conducted the incentive-
payment experiment in September-November 2013. To avoid interfering with the process of dif-
fusion to the non-tech-drop firms from the first experiment, we focused on only the 35 tech-drop
firms (including both initial responders and initial non-responders). At the time of random-
ization, we believed that 34 of these firms were still active. These were divided into the four
similarly-sized strata: (1) firms in the two smaller strata from the tech-drop experiment that
had not adopted the die as of August 2013, (2) firms in the two larger strata from the tech-drop
experiment that had not yet adopted the die, (3) firms from the initial non-responder stratum
from the tech-drop experiment that had not yet adopted the die, and (4) firms that had already
adopted the die. Within each stratum, firms were randomly assigned in equal proportion to
a treatment group (which we call Group A) and a control group (Group B). Three of the 34
assigned firms were subsequently revealed to have stopped manufacturing soccer balls, leaving
15 firms in Group A and 16 in Group B.
To firms in Group B we gave a reminder about the offset die and the new cutting pattern,
and informed them about the two-pentagon variant of the offset die (which, as noted above,
had proven more popular than the four-pentagon offset die we originally distributed.) We also
offered to do a new demonstration with their cutters. To each firm in Group A, we gave the
same refresher, the same offer of a new demonstration, and the same information about the
two-pentagon variant. In addition, we explained to the owner that cutters and printers paid
piece-rates had an incentive to misinform the owner about the value of the technology. We then
offered (to the owner) to pay one cutter and one printer lump-sum bonuses roughly equivalent
to their monthly incomes — 15,000 Rs (US$150) and 12,000 Rs (US$120), respectively — on
the condition that within one month the cutter demonstrate competence in using the new die
and the printer demonstrate competence in printing pairs of offset pentagon pieces cut by the
new die. If the owner agreed to the intervention, we explained the intervention to one cutter
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and one printer chosen by the owner, paid them 1/3 of the incentive payment on the spot, and
scheduled a time to return to test their performance using the die.39
The performance target for cutters was 272 pentagons from a single sheet in three minutes
using the new die. The target for the printer was 48 pairs of pentagons cut by the offset
die in three minutes.40 We provided the owner with 20 laminated sheets for his workers to
practice with, printing screens for offset pentagon pairs, and a nominal Rs 5,000 ($50) to cover
additional costs such as overhead (e.g. electricity while the cutters were practicing). We returned
after approximately one month to test the employees and, upon successful achievement of the
performance targets, to pay the remaining 2/3 of the incentive payments. Without revealing
ahead of time that we would do so, we allowed for a buffer of 30 seconds and 5 pentagons for
cutters and 30 seconds for printers.41
Table 11 evaluates baseline balance by comparing firm characteristics across Group A and
Group B firms at the time of our visit to explain the intervention (September 2013). No differ-
ences in means are statistically significant. It appears that randomization was successful.42
7.2 Results
Ten of the 15 Group A firms agreed to participate in the experiment.43 Table 12 reports the
times achieved by the chosen cutter at each firm. The average time was 2 minutes and 52
seconds, approximately 27 percent longer than the average time to cut with the traditional die
(2 minutes and 15 seconds). The minimum time reported using the offset die was 2 minutes
and 28 seconds, or 9.6 percent longer than with the traditional die. It is partly for this reason,
and partly because cutters do not need to change sheets as frequently with the new die, that we
believe that the 50 percent increase in labor time factored into the cost calculations above in
Section 3 is conservative. In addition, many cutters expressed confidence that with additional
use they could lower their cutting time. All printers easily achieved their target, consistent with
the assumption in Section 3 that, despite some printers’ fears, the new die does not increase
labor time for printing.
39To the extent possible, we attempted to make the payment directly to the cutter and printer. In two cases,
the owner insisted that we pay him and that he pass on the money to the employees, and we acceded to this
request.
40The 3-minute targets were chosen after conducting speed tests at two of the pilot firms mentioned in Section
5. They are approximately one third higher than the time to cut a single sheet using the original die and the time
to print 48 two-pentagon panels cut using the original die.
41That is, the effective target for cutters was 267 pentagons from one sheet in 3 minutes 30 seconds, and for
printers was 48 pairs in 3 minutes 30 seconds.
42Because of an error by our enumerators, one firm that was assigned to Group B was offered the incentive-
payment intervention. This occurred while two co-authors of the paper were in the field, and the error was caught
within hours of its occurrence. To maintain balance, we randomly selected one as-yet-untreated Group A firm
from the same stratum and re-assigned it to Group B.
43In two of these 10 firms, it was not possible to complete the printer performance test.
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In order to investigate adoption in response to the incentive-payment intervention, we carried
out a survey round in January-March 2014, 2-5 months after the completion of the intervention.44
As above, we classify a firm as an adopter if it reports that it is currently using the offset die and
has produced more than 1,000 balls with it in the past month. Of the 10 Group A firms that
agreed to participate in the experiment, two firms had already adopted the die at the time we
ran the incentive experiment. Of the remaining 8 firms, 5 firms subsequently adopted. Of the
16 Group B firms, 3 firms had already adopted prior to the invention. None of the remaining
13 firms subsequently adopted.
Table 13 formally assesses the impact of the incentive-payment intervention on adoption
rates. All regressions include dummies for the four strata described above. Columns 1-4 include
all strata, and Columns 5-8 omit the stratum of firms that had already adopted by August
2013. The first-stage estimates (Columns 1 and 5) indicate, not surprisingly, that assignment to
Group A is significantly associated with greater probability of receiving the incentive-payment
treatment; that is, we have a strong first stage. The dependent variable in Columns 2-4 and 6-8
is a 0/1 indicator for whether a firm has adopted, i.e. is currently using the offset die and has
produced more than 1,000 balls using it. The OLS estimates in Columns 2 and 6 are positive
and significant, but one might be worried about selection into treatment. The reduced-form
(intent-to-treat) results in Columns 3 and 7 do not suffer from such selection issues and indicate
a positive and significant (at the 5 percent level) causal relationship between assignment to
Group A and adoption. Adoption rates increased by 0.32 among the treatment group or by
0.38 if we restrict attention to only the firms who had not already adopted at the start of the
experiment. The IV estimates (the effect of treatment on the treated) are substantially higher
(0.48 or 0.63 if we restrict attention only to initial non-adopters). However, since the one third
of firms who refused the intervention may have chosen to do so because of particularly large
costs of adoption (or small benefits), these IV estimates should be treated with caution.
To check robustness, Table 14 reports results using an alternative indicator of adoption,
namely whether the firm purchased its first offset die (beyond the trade-in that we paid for)
after September 1, 2013. Of the eight firms that accepted the intervention and had not adopted
by August 2013, three subsequently purchased their first offset die. (One of these firms had not
produced with it yet at the time of our most recent survey.)45 Table 14 shows that the positive
causal effect of the incentive-payment treatment on adoption is robust to using this alternative
measure.
It is important to acknowledge that the sample sizes in the incentive-payment experiment are
44In one case, the firm’s report regarding adoption was ambiguous and our enumerators followed up with the
firm to clarify in May 2014.
45In addition, one large Group-A firm that was already classified as an adopter because it was using the offset
cutting pattern for table cutting (see footnote 12), purchased its first die (beyond the four-panel offset die we
originally gave) following the beginning of our intervention.
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small. An alternative to large-N statistical inference are permutation tests whose properties are
independent of sample size (see Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) for the
use of this type of inference in a similar context). We determine the proportion of all possible
treatment assignments that produce coefficients as large as or larger than the ones we find. This
procedure produces an exact p-value and does not require any asymptotic approximations. Given
the selection discussion above, we focus on the more conservative ITT estimates in columns 3
and 7 of Tables 13 and 14. Within each of the four strata, we assigned treatment status with 50
percent probability. The stratum of smaller firms contained 6 firms, the stratum of larger firms
contained 12 firms, the stratum of initial non-responders contained 8 firms and the stratum of




















Figure 16 plots the distribution of coefficients obtained from regressing die use on assignment
to group A for the millions of possible treatment assignments. The left panel reports the distri-
bution of outcomes under the specifications with all strata and the right panel reports outcomes
from the initial non-adopters sample only. The vertical line in both figures denotes the observed
ITT effects reported in columns 3 and 7 of Table 13. Note that there are only a handful of
possible coefficients despite the several million possible permutations. This is because of the
small number of adopting firms and because no control firm has adopted the die. Yet in both
cases, the observed ITT coefficients are the largest effects that could have been observed under
any treatment assignment. In other words, there is no possible outcome that is more extreme
than the one we observe in each specification. We can use the distribution to construct p-values
for the hypothesis test that the coefficients we find are different from zero. For our main measure
of adoption, current use, the p-value is 3.04 percent in both the all firm and initial non-adopter
samples. Figure 17 presents a similar analysis for our alternative indicator of adoption, die
purchases, with corresponding p-values of 4.28 percent in the all-firm sample and 21.42 percent
in the initial non-adopters sample.
The results indicate a robust effect of the incentive payment treatment on adoption. Con-
sidering current use (> 1, 000 balls) as the outcome, it is striking that over half of the treated
firms that had not previously adopted responded to the treatment. As we discuss in the next
section, It seems hard to rationalize such a large response to such a small incentive, unless the
incentive is helping to resolve an organizational bottleneck within the firm.
7.3 Examining Alternative Explanations for Increase in Take-up
In this sub-section, we examine two alternative explanations for our finding that a small incentive
payment substantially increased adoption.













7.3.1 Alternative hypothesis: subsidies for fixed costs
The first alternative we consider is that there was no information transmission from workers
to owners, but that we mechanically induced firms to adopt by subsidizing the fixed costs of
adoption. This explanation is best seen through the lens of the model. In the model, suppose
that the owner is aware of conditional wage contracts and that there is no cost of using them,
G = 0. The owner then simply weighs the variable cost reduction from the new technology
against the fixed costs of adoption. These fixed costs may include a lump-sum wage bonus to
workers to compensate them for a learning period where they will earn less. Our incentive-
payment experiment could be seen as providing a subsidy to cover some of these fixed costs of
adoption, and the subsidy may itself have induced the owner to adopt.
Is this a quantitatively plausible explanation of our findings? To organize our thinking
about this question, we can write the present discounted value of expected additional profit
from adoption for firm f as follows:




(1 + rf )t
(9)
where FCf0 are fixed costs of adoption, which must be paid up front and may be firm-specific;
Pr(success)f is the probability perceived by the firm that the technology works as we said it
does; NV Bf are net variable benefits per cutter per month; and rf is the interest rate faced
by the firm. Net Variable Benefits can be calculated for each firm following the method of
Section 3.2. For firms that did not have to buy the die, which correspond to the tech-drop
firms in the incentive-payment experiment, observed fixed costs are Rs 10,800/US$108.47 In
this section, we make the assumption that the Rs 32,000/US$32048 we paid in the incentive-
payment treatment were also necessary and part of the true fixed cost of adoption.49 We thus
take the total observed fixed costs to be Rs 42,800/US$428.50 The assumption regarding wage
payments seems conservative. In the incentive-payment experiment, only one worker felt that the
payment was insufficient to cover his costs of adoption, suggesting that the incentive payments
were greater than the “training” cost faced by workers in the great majority of firms.
As a first step toward answering the quantitative plausibility question, suppose that there
47Rs 800/US$8 to have screens redesigned and remade and Rs 10,000/US$100 for a new die for the hole-
punching machine; see Section 3.2 for further details.
48Rs 15,000/US$150 to the cutter, Rs 12,000/US$120 to the printer, plus Rs 5,000/US$50 to the owner to
cover overhead.
49In Section 3.2 we assumed that workers wages went up by 50% to compensate them for using the slower
technology. The discussion in Section 6 suggests that many firms do not adjust their wages and so in this section
we remove this component and instead assume that the firm must only pay the one-off conditional wage payment.
50This calculation uses net variable benefits per cutter since we assume that the fixed costs need to be paid
for each cutter in the firm. This is a conservative assumption since it is possible that firms could, for example,
share the hole-punching machine across cutters.
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is no uncertainty about the technology (i.e. Pr(success)f = 1) and no unobserved fixed costs
beyond the US$428 mentioned above. Under these assumptions, (9) can be reconciled with
non-adoption only if firms face extremely high interest rates and hence have a small effective
discount factor 1/(1 + rf ).
51 For initial non-adopters, the values of firm-specific interest rates
that set Πf = 0 in (9) represent lower bounds on the firm-specific interest rates. At the 10
th
percentile, the lower bound is 7.8% per month; at the 90th percentile, the lower bound is 70.7%
per month. In our baseline survey, we asked firms explicitly about the interest rates they face,
and the responses ranged from 3% to 19% per year ; these are an order of magnitude lower than
the implied lower bound for most firms. That is, in the absence of both uncertainty about the
technology and unobserved fixed costs, the interest rates (and rate of discounting) that would
be required to explain the low initial rates of adoption appear to be implausibly high.
This argument leaves open the possibility that some combination of uncertainty and unob-
served fixed costs can account for the low initial rates of adoption we observed. To address this
possibility, we take a different approach: we allow for uncertainty and unobserved fixed costs
and ask whether these can explain both the low rates of initial adoption and the magnitude of
the response to our incentive-payment intervention. The unobserved fixed costs may represent
attention costs for the owner or psychic costs involved in changing established routines. We as-
sume, conservatively, that the interest rate is the highest of the self-reported interest rates, 19%
per year. As a benchmark, we assume that owners place a 50% probability on the event that
the technology works as we described (i.e. Pr(success)f = .5); we consider alternative priors
below. Under these assumptions, we can place bounds on the values of unobserved fixed costs
that can explain the behavior we observe.52 These bounds on fixed costs are plotted by rank in
Figure 18 for the 31 firms in the incentive-payment experiment. The black outlines represent
the lower bounds that would be implied by non-adoption, and the red outlines the upper bounds
that would be implied by adoption in response to the incentive-payment intervention.53
There are two important points to notice in Figure 18. The first is that, for almost all
firms, the US$320 subsidy is small relative to the implied lower bound on fixed costs. At the
10th percentile, the implied lower bound on fixed costs is US$2,286; at the 90th percentile, it
is US$20,718. For the vast majority of firms the implied fixed costs are an order of magnitude
greater than the subsidy. The second point to note is that the firms’ lower bounds are not
bunched closely together. Therefore, if a substantial portion of the unobserved fixed costs is
51This is another way of stating the argument from Section 3.2.3 that the observable fixed costs of adoption
can be recouped within a relatively short amount of time by almost all firms.




. If a firm adopts in response to the incentive-payment experiment, it must be that Πf > 0




53Firms that initially adopted are indicated by the sold black bars; for these firms, we can conclude only that
fixed costs are less than what is indicated by the black outline. The firms that adopted in experiment 2 are
indicated by solid green bars.
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common across firms, a subsidy of US$320 would only lead to a few firms adopting and hence
ITT coefficients much smaller than the ones we found.
We can make these claims more precise by imposing some structure on the distribution of
unobserved fixed costs. Suppose that fixed costs are distributed log normally:
ln(FC0f ) = θ + εf (10)
where εf ∼ N (0, σ2ε). We can use information on adoption in both experiments 1 and 2 to
estimate θ and the error variance, σ2ε .
54 Panel A of Table 15 reports these estimates θ̂ and σ̂2ε
under six priors ranging from Pr(success)f = .01 to Pr(success)f = 1.
With these estimates in hand, we can ask: what is the probability that we would observe
an effect of a US$320 subsidy on adoption as large as the effect we observed in experiment 2?
To answer this question we use θ̂ and σ̂2ε to simulate 1,000 fixed cost draws, with Figure 19
displaying the full distribution of Group A firms switching from non-adoption to adoption as a
result of a US$320 payment. Panel B of Table 15 reports the corresponding probabilities of 5
or more Group A firms switching. The probability of observing an increase in adoption of that
magnitude is exceedingly low, between .000 and .003, for all but the most pessimistic prior of
Pr(success)f = .01. Although such a low prior is theoretically possible, it seems unrealistically
pessimistic given the nature of the technology.
In Panel C of Table 15, we turn to the corresponding ITT estimates from these simula-
tions. The ITT estimates range between .01 and .08 for priors between Pr(success)f = 1 and
Pr(success)f = .05, much lower than the 0.32 we obtained in our incentive-payment experi-
ment. Even for the most pessimistic prior of Pr(success)f = .01, we only obtain an ITT of
0.22. In summary, a US$320 subsidy cannot plausibly explain the magnitude of the increase in
adoption we observed in our second experiment. Even when we choose the mean and variance
54We estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood. Let adopt1f denote an indicator if firm f had adopted
the technology in experiment 1, and adopt2,f an analogous indicator for adoption after experiment 2. The log





























ln(NV Bf )− θ
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)]}
The first expression on the right-hand-side of (11) captures the contribution to the likelihood of initial non-adopter
group-A firms who are induced to switch from non-adoption to adoption because of the $320 subsidy. The second
expression captures initial non-adopter group-A firms who are not induced to switch adoption status. The third
expression is the contribution of initial adopter firms. We jointly maximize the likelihood function with the group
B firms who have the same likelihood function except adopt2f = 0 ∀f and there is no US$320 payment inside the
argument of the normal CDF, Φ(.).
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of the unobserved fixed costs to best fit the adoption patterns in experiments 1 and 2, a US$320
subsidy can only generate our experimental findings under extremely pessimistic priors.
7.3.2 Alternative hypothesis: salience
A second alternative explanation is that the incentive-payment treatment increased the salience
of the new technology and this itself led firms to adopt, independent of any effects on information
flows within the firm. There are two variants of this explanation. One variant is that the
reminder about the technology during the incentive-intervention visit itself “nudged” firms into
adoption. This variant can be quickly dismissed. We gave the same reminder to the control
firms for the incentive intervention (Group B firms) and we saw no firms adopt subsequently as
a result. Also, it is worth noting that we visited all of the tech-drop firms multiple times as part
of our survey rounds. During each of these visits, we discussed the new technology with them
and if they were not using it we asked why.
A different variant of the salience story is that by putting more money on the table we sent
a stronger signal about our own beliefs about the efficacy of our technology, and this in turn
led firms to update their priors about the technology, inducing some firms to adopt. While it
is difficult to dismiss this explanation definitively, it also seems unlikely. We believe that it was
clear to firms from the outset, in the initial technology-drop implementation, that we believed
that the technology was effective. We said so in the initial treatment, and we then demonstrated
the efficacy of the technology using firms’ own cutters. We then returned to each firm numerous
times and, as noted above, in the case of the tech-drop firms we discussed the offset die each
time. The amount of money we spent on surveying each firm far exceeded the US$320 payment
in the incentive intervention. In short, while in retrospect it seems clear that many owners
did not believe us when we told them that the technology works, it does not appear that their
skepticism was based on their beliefs about how strongly we held our beliefs, or that the US$320
affected their beliefs about how strongly we held our beliefs. It seems more likely that they
believed that we simply had insufficient knowledge and experience in the industry, and hence
that our (strongly held) confidence in the technology was misplaced.
8 Conclusion
This paper has two basic empirical findings. First, despite the evident advantages of the tech-
nology we invented, a surprisingly small number of firms have adopted it, even among the set
of firms that we gave it to. This is consistent with a long tradition of research on technology
adoption that has found diffusion to be slow for some technologies, but given the characteristics
of our technology — low fixed costs, minimal required changes to other aspects of the produc-
tion process, limited uncertainty about the cost advantage of the technology — the low adoption
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rate seems particularly puzzling. Second, with a very small change in the incentives facing key
employees in the firm — tiny in monetary terms relative to firms’ revenues and the benefits of
adoption — we induced a statistically significant increase in adoption. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that a misalignment of incentives within the firm — in particular, employees
paid piece rate have an incentive to resist adoption of a material-saving technology that slows
them down — is an important barrier to adoption. Although for most firms we do not observe
directly the communication between employees and owners, it appears that at least one way that
employees have resisted the adoption of our new technology is by misinforming owners about
the value of the technology. It further appears that the incentive-payment intervention had a
significant effect because it induced workers to report truthfully to owners.
The natural question is why many owners did not simply change the payment scheme on
their own. We have considered two possible explanations. One is that they were not aware
of the availability of alternative payment schemes, or did not understand that an alternative
scheme would be desirable. A second possibility is that there are transaction costs involved in
changing contracts, even implicit ones. Above we discussed a number of possible reasons for the
existence of such costs. Whatever their source, owners may weigh any costs of modifying con-
tracts against the expected benefits of adopting new technologies. If owners have low priors that
a beneficial new technology will arrive (or that a technology that has arrived is beneficial), they
may rationally be unwilling to pay even quite small transaction costs. These two explanations
for the stickiness of wage contracts have similar observable implications, and it is difficult for us
to distinguish between them in our context. At the same time, the key point for our study is
that many firms did not in fact change their payment schemes, and this left scope for our very
modest intervention to have a large effect on adoption.
Although our empirical results are clearly specific to the setting we study, our findings suggest
three implications that we believe are likely to apply more broadly. First, we have provided
reasonably direct evidence evidence of a complementarity, in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts
(1990, 1995), between a technological innovation (the new die) and an organizational innovation
(conditional wage contracts). We suspect that similar complementarities between technical and
organizational innovations exist in many other settings. This in turn suggests that the study of
adoption of particular technologies cannot be divorced from the study of organizational change
in the firms doing the adopting.
Second, there appears to be a form of inertia in employment relationships that can hinder
technological change. We have argued that firms’ choices of labor contracts depend on the rate
at which beneficial new technologies are expected to arrive. It also appears that labor contracts,
once established, may be difficult to modify. The implication is that industries that evolve in
technologically stable environments may be less able to adapt to technological change than new
industries. Simple piece-rate contracts may well have been optimal in Sialkot before we showed
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up, but the very fact that firms in Sialkot have been producing for decades using piece-rates and
the same basic production process may itself have contributed to low adoption rates of the new
die.
Finally, it seems likely that in order for technology adoption to be successful employees have
to have an expectation that they will share in the gains from adoption. Such an expectation
may be generated by a variety of different types of contracts, implicit or explicit. But to the
extent that owners and managers must rely on the knowledge of shopfloor workers about the
value of new technologies or how best to implement them, it appears to be important that a
credible gain-sharing mechanism be in place.
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As a preliminary step, we first establish several properties of the profit functions defined in (2).
Lemma 1. Given the definition of π(·) in (2) and condition (5a), we have:
π2(β)− π0(β)

< 0 if 0 < β < β̂2
= 0 if β = β̂2
> 0 if β > β̂2
where β̂2 = Ω +
√
Ω2 + F
s02−s22 , Ω =
s20β0−s22β2
s20−s22
, β̂2 > Ω, and 0 < β̂2 < β0.





















. Note that Ω < β0 and
may be negative. Setting π2(β)−π0(β) = 0 define the values of β̂2. There is also a negative root,
which we can ignore since we are requiring β > 0. The fact that β̂2 > Ω follows immediately
from the expression for β̂2. The fact that β̂2 < β0 follows from condition (5a).
Lemma 2. Given the definition of π(·) in (2) and condition (5b), we have:
π3(β)− π0(β)

< 0 if β < β̂3
= 0 if β = β̂3
> 0 if β̂3 < β <
ˆ̂
β3
= 0 if β =
ˆ̂
β3
< 0 if β >
ˆ̂
β3
where β̂3 = β0 −
√
β20 − Fs32−s02 ,
ˆ̂
β3 = β0 +
√
β0 − Fs32−s02 and 0 < β̂3 < β0 < β2 <
ˆ̂
β3 < 2β0.
Proof. From (2), we can write:






















. Condition (5b) implies






− F > 0. Setting π3(β) − π0(β) = 0 defines the values of the roots, β̂3 and ˆ̂β3.
The facts that 0 < β̂3 < β0 <
ˆ̂
β3 < 2β0 follow directly from the expressions for β̂3 and
ˆ̂
β3. The
fact that β2 <
ˆ̂
β3 follows from condition (5b).
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Lemma 3. Given the definition of π(·) in (2), we have:
π1(β)− π0(β)

< 0 if 0 < β <
ˆ̂
β1
= 0 if β =
ˆ̂
β1





















β20 − F (A3)




s02−s12 < 0 and
ˆ̂
β1 defined above. Since
we have assumed β > 0, β̂1 will not play a role.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let µ(tj |mi, β) be the principal’s belief that the technology is type j, given the agent’s signal
mi and the piece rate β. Recall that the principal’s priors are ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3. Since m2 is
never signaled on the equilibrium path, µ(t2|m2, β∗) is an off-path belief and we specify it




, µ(t2|m2, β∗) = 1, µ(t3|m3, β∗) = 1.
To prove the proposition, it suffices to show that there is no profitable deviation for either
principal or agent.
A.2.1 No Incentive For Agent to Deviate
First we show there is no incentive for the agent to deviate from his signaling strategy holding
fixed the principal’s strategy. Note that conditional on the piece rate being held fixed, the agent





For a given piece rate, β, there are three states of the world to consider:
1. If the technology is of type 1, the agent signals m1 and the principal does not adopt. The
agent has no incentive to deviate and signal m2 or m3, which will induce the principal to
adopt, since s1 < s0.
2. If the technology is of type 2, the agent signals m1. The agent does not have an incentive
to deviate and signal m2 or m3 as this would induce adoption and s2 < s0.
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3. If the technology is of type 3, the agent signals m3 and the principal adopts. He has
no incentive to deviate and signal m1, which induces the principal not to adopt, because
s0 < s3. He also has no (strict) incentive to deviate and signal m2, since this also induces
adoption and leads to the same payoff as signaling m3.
A.2.2 No Incentive For Principal to Deviate
Now we show that there is no incentive for the principal to deviate from her adoption strategy,
holding fixed the agent’s strategy. First we find the optimal adoption strategies for the principal
in Stage 4, given the three possible signals she can receive, for all possible wage contracts offered
in Stage 1. Then we find the optimal contract the principal offers in Stage 1, anticipating her
own behavior in Stage 4.
Optimal Adoption Strategies in Stage 4
For a given β, there are three possible signals by the agent to consider:










where the left-hand side is expected profit from non-adoption and the right-hand side the
expected profit from adoption. This can be rewritten:
ρ1[π0(β)− π1(β)] + ρ2[π0(β)− π2(β)] ≥ 0 (A5)
We first show that (A5) holds for β = β0. In Benchmark 2 above (Section 6.2.2), we
showed that β̃ is the optimal piece rate if the principal bases her decision only on her
priors and adopts. This implies:
π̃(β̃) ≥ ρ1π1(β0) + ρ2π2(β0) + ρ3π3(β0)
By condition (5c), π0(β0) > π̃(β̃). Hence:
π0(β0) > ρ1π1(β0) + ρ2π2(β0) + ρ3π3(β0)
π0(β0)− ρ3π3(β0) > ρ1π1(β0) + ρ2π2(β0)
π0(β0)− ρ3π0(β0) > ρ1π1(β0) + ρ2π2(β0)
(ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β0) > ρ1π1(β0) + ρ2π2(β0)
ρ1[π0(β0)− π1(β0)] + ρ2[π0(β0)− π2(β0)] > 0
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where the third inequality follows from the fact that π3(β0) > π0(β0) (from condition
(5b)). Hence (A5) holds for β = β0.
Now consider β ∈ (0, β0). By Lemma 3, π0(β)− π1(β) > 0 in this region. For β ∈ (0, β̂2],
π0(β) − π2(β) ≥ 0 by Lemma 1 and hence (A5) is clearly satisfied. For β ∈ (β̂2, β0),
π0(β)−π2(β) is decreasing in β (refer to (A1), noting that Ω < β̂2); since (A5) is satisfied
at β0, it must be satisfied in this region.
Finally, consider β > β0. By (A3) and (A1), both π0(β) − π1(β) and π0(β) − π2(β) are
strictly decreasing in this region. Hence there is a single crossing at which (A5) is satisfied
with equality at some β > β0; call this value β. For β ∈ (β0, β), (A5) holds and the
principal has no incentive to deviate and adopt. For β = β, (A5) holds with equality and
the principal possibly plays a mixed adoption strategy. For β > β, (A5) does not hold and
the principal has a strict incentive to adopt.
2. If the signal is m2 then the principal believes that the technology is type 2, given her
off-path belief. By Lemma 1, for β < β̂2, π2(β) < π0(β) and the principal has an incentive
to deviate; for β = β̂2, π2(β) = π0(β) and the principal possibly plays a mixed adoption
strategy; and for β ≥ β̂2, π2(β) ≥ π0(β) and the principal has no incentive to deviate from
adopting.
3. If the signal is m3, the principal knows that the technology is type 3, i.e. µ(t3|m3, β) = 1
for any β. By Lemma 2, for β ∈ (β̂3, ˆ̂β3), π3(β) > π0(β) and the principal has no incentive
to deviate from adoption; for β = β̂3 or β =
ˆ̂
β3, π3(β) = π0(β) and the principal plays a
possibly mixed adoption strategy; and for β ∈ (0, β̂3) and β > ˆ̂β3, π3(β) < π0(β) and the
principal has an incentive to deviate and not adopt.
Optimal Contracts in Stage 1
We are now in a position to calculate expected profits for the principal in Stage 1, given
the principal’s priors, the agent’s strategy for signaling in Stage 3, and the principal’s adoption
strategy in Stage 4.
There are two cases to consider, depending on the relative magnitudes of the critical values
ˆ̂
β3, and β, both defined above.
1. Case 1: β >
ˆ̂
β3. Expected profits can be expressed as:
π∗(β) =

π0(β) if 0 < β < β̂3
(ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) + ρ3π3(β) if β̂3 ≤ β < ˆ̂β3
(ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) + ρ3π0(β) = π0(β) if
ˆ̂
β3 ≤ β < β
ρ1π1(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π0(β) if β ≥ β
(A6)
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2. Case 2: β <
ˆ̂
β3. Expected profits can be expressed as:
π∗(β) =

π0(β) if 0 < β < β̂3
(ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) + ρ3π3(β) if β̂3 ≤ β < β
ρ1π1(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π3(β) if β ≤ β < ˆ̂β3
ρ1π1(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π0(β) if β ≥ ˆ̂β3
(A7)
Note that in both cases the π∗(β) function is continuous at the critical values. At β̂3 and
ˆ̂
β3, π3(β) = π0(β) by Lemma 2; at β, (ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) = ρ1π1(β) + ρ2π2(β).
Note also that each of the profit functions πi(β) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is strictly increasing for
β < β0 and strictly decreasing for β > β2. Hence π
∗(β) is strictly increasing for β < β0 and
strictly decreasing for β > β2 within each of the intervals defined in (A6) and (A7). Since π
∗(β)
is continuous at the critical values, we know π∗(β) itself is strictly increasing for β < β0 and
strictly decreasing for β > β2. Hence any maximum for π
∗(β) must lie in the region β ∈ [β0, β2].
Consider Case 1 from above. Since β̂3 < β0 < β2 <
ˆ̂
β3 by Lemma 2, in the relevant region
β ∈ [β0, β2] expected profit is given by: π∗(β) = (ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) + ρ3π3(β). Since both π0(β) and
π3(β) are maximized at β0, we have that π
∗(β) is maximized at β0.
Now consider Case 2 from above. If β > β2 then π
∗(β) = (ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) + ρ3π3(β) over
the relevant range β ∈ [β0, β2] and β0 is optimal, as in the previous paragraph. If β < β2,
then there are two sub-regions to consider: β ∈ [β0, β) and β ∈ [β, β2]. For β ∈ [β0, β),
π∗(β) = (ρ1 +ρ2)π0(β)+ρ3π3(β) and β0 is optimal as before. For β ∈ [β, β2], π∗(β) = ρ1π1(β)+
ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π3(β). As discussed in Benchmark 2 in Section 6.2.2, this function is maximized
by β̃ defined in (3). Hence supβ∈[β,β2] π
∗(β) ≤ π̃(β̃). By condition (5c), π̃(β̃) < π0(β0). By
Lemma 2, π3(β) > π0(β) for β ∈ [β0, β2]; this implies π0(β0) < π∗(β0) in this region. Hence:
supβ∈[β,β2] π
∗(β) < π∗(β0) That is, the choice β = β0 dominates all β ∈ [β, β2], in addition to
β ∈ [β0, β).
Therefore in both Case 1 and Case 2, β0 is optimal. The principal has no incentive to
deviate.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove by contradiction. Assume that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the
agent signals truthfully, i.e. signals mi when the technology is type i, for i = 1, 2, 3. We first
derive the principal’s strategy that must hold in such an equilibrium. We then ask whether the
agent has an incentive to deviate, given the strategy of the principal.
In Stage 4, after the agent has revealed truthfully, the principal’s optimal adoption strategy
is simply: if the signal is mi, adopt if πi(β) > π0(β), do not adopt if πi(β) < π0(β), and play
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a possibly mixed strategy if πi(β) = π0(β), where the corresponding ranges of β are given by
Lemmas 1-3.
In Stage 1, There are two cases to consider, depending on the relative magnitudes of the
critical values β̂2 and β̂3 defined in Lemmas 1 and 2.
1. Case 1: β̂3 < β̂2. Expected profits can be expressed as:
π∗(β) =

π0(β) if 0 < β < β̂3
(ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β) + ρ3π3(β) if β̂3 ≤ β < β̂2
ρ1π0(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π3(β) if β̂2 ≤ β < ˆ̂β3
ρ1π0(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π0(β) if
ˆ̂
β3 ≤ β < β̂1
ρ1π1(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π0(β) if β ≥ ˆ̂β1
(A8)
2. Case 2: β̂2 < β̂3. Expected profits can be expressed as:
π∗(β) =

π0(β) if 0 < β < β̂2
(ρ1 + ρ3)π0(β) + ρ2π2(β) if β̂2 ≤ β < β̂3
ρ1π0(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π3(β) if β̂3 ≤ β < ˆ̂β3
ρ1π0(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π0(β) if
ˆ̂
β3 ≤ β < β̂1
ρ1π1(β) + ρ2π2(β) + ρ3π0(β) if β ≥ ˆ̂β1
(A9)
As in the proof of Proposition 1, in both cases the π∗(β) function is continuous, since
π3(β) = π0(β) at β̂3 and
ˆ̂
β3 by Lemma 2, π2(β) = π0(β) at β̂2 by Lemma 1, and π1(β) = π0(β)
at β̂1 by Lemma 3. Also as in the proof of Proposition 1, π
∗(β) in strictly increasing for
β ∈ (0, β0) and strictly decreasing for β > β2 since each of the πi(β) functions is increasing and
π∗(β) is continuous. Hence the principal’s optimal β must be in [β0, β2].
Recall that β̂2 < β0 (Lemma 1)and β̂3 < β0 < β2 <
ˆ̂
β3 (Lemma 1). Hence for any β in
the range [β0, β2], the principal adopts following signals m2 or m3 and does not adopt following
signal m1.
Given this strategy of the principal, the agent has a clear incentive to deviate from truth-
telling. If the technology is type 2, the agent is better off signaling m1 to discourage adoption,




2 . Hence there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium under
which the agent reveals truthfully.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
It once more suffices to show that there is no profitable deviation for either principal or agent.
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Under this wage schedule, an agent observing a type 2 technology will not want to deviate









where the left-hand side is the agent’s utility if type 2 is adopted, and the right-hand side his
utility under the existing technology (refer to A4). Noting that β∗∗ = β0 and β
∗∗ + γ∗∗ = β2




2−F and π0(β0) = s20β20 . Condition
(5a) implies π2(β2) > π0(β0) (since π2(β0) is increasing for β ∈ [β0, β2)) and hence (A10). The
agent also does not wish to deviate if he observes the other two types for identical reasons as in
the proof of Proposition 1.
The principal’s next-best strategy is not to pay G and to follow the same strategy as in
Proposition 1.55 The principal will not deviate to this strategy if the following holds:
ρ1π0(β0) + ρ2π2(β2) + ρ3π3(β3)−G > (ρ1 + ρ2)π0(β∗) + ρ3π3(β∗)
where the left-hand side is the payoff to the strategy of Proposition 3 and the right-hand side
is the payoff to the strategy of Proposition 1. Condition (7) ensures this holds, since β∗ = β3 =
β0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the proposition, it again suffices to show that there is no profitable deviation for either
principal or agent. First we show there is no incentive for the agent to deviate from his strategy,
holding fixed the principal’s strategy. Suppose the experimenter offers L in Stage 2. If the
technology is of type 1 or 3, the agent has no incentive to deviate, for identical reasons as in
Proposition 1. If the technology is of type 2, the agent signals m2. The agent does not have an
incentive to deviate and signal m1 as this would induce the principal to not adopt which will













assumed. The agent also has no (strict) incentive to deviate and signal m3, since this also induces
adoption and leads to the same payoff as signaling m2. Now suppose that the experimenter does
not offer L in Stage 2. Then the agent has no incentive deviate for the same reasons as in
Proposition 1.
Now we show that there is no incentive for the principal to deviate from her strategy, holding
fixed the agent’s strategy. First, recall that we assume G > ρ2 [π2(β2)− π0(β0)] and that the
principal has a zero probability prior that an experimenter will offer an incentive payment L in
55If the principal does not pay G, the agent’s strategy is the same as Proposition 1 and we showed that there
is no profitable deviation for the principal given the agent’s strategy.
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Stage 2. Therefore, in Stage 1 the principal is playing the game described in Proposition 1 and
so, as shown in the proof for Proposition 1, she has no incentive to deviate if she offers the wage
contract
(
α∗ = 0, β∗ = p−c02
)
since it is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that game.
Now we turn to the principal’s decision in Stage 4. There are three possible signals by the
agent to consider: If the signal is m1, then the condition for the principal not to deviate can be
written:
π0(β0) ≥ π1(β0)
which is true by Lemma 3. If the signal is m2, then the condition for the principal not to deviate
can be written:
π2(β0) ≥ π0(β0)
where there is no L on the left hand side since we, rather than the principal, pay the lump-sum
bonus. This inequality is true by Lemma 1. If the signal is m3, then the condition for the
principal not to deviate can be written:
π3(β0) ≥ π0(β0)
which is true by Lemma 2.
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Figure 1: “Buckyball” Design
Notes: Figure shows the standard “buckyball” design. It combines 20 hexagons and 12 pentagons.



































Notes: Figure shows import market share within the United States in HS 10-digit category 9506.62.40.80
(“inflatable soccer balls”). Source: United States customs data.
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Figure 3: Making the Laminated Sheet (Step 1)
Notes: Figure displays workers laminating a rexine sheet, which is the first stage of producing a soccer
ball. Layers of cloth (cotton and/or polyester) are glued to artificial leather called rexine using a latex-based
adhesive to form the laminated sheet.
Figure 4: Cutting the Laminated Sheet (Step 2)
Notes: Figure displays a cutter using a hydraulic press to cut hexagons and pentagons from the laminated
sheet.
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Figure 5: Printing the Designs (Step 3)
Notes: Figure displays a worker printing a logo on the pentagon and hexagon panels.
Figure 6: Stitching (Step 4)
Notes: Figure displays a worker stitching a soccer ball. Source: Der Spiegel.
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Figure 7: Traditional 2-Hexagon and 2-Pentagon Dies
Notes: Figure displays the traditional two-panel hexagon and pentagon dies.
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Figure 8: Laminated Sheet Wastage from Cutting Hexagons
Notes: Figure displays laminated rexine wastage from cutting hexagons with the traditional two-hexagon die.
Figure 9: Laminated Sheet Wastage from Cutting Pentagons
Notes: Figure displays laminated rexine wastage from cutting pentagons with the traditional two-pentagon
die.
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Figure 10: Snapshot from YouTube Video of Adidas Jabulani Production Process
Notes: YouTube video available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbLjk4OTRdI. Accessed June 10,
2010.
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Figure 11: Cutting Pattern for “Offset” Four-Pentagon Die
Notes: Figure displays the cutting pattern for the four-panel offset die.
Figure 12: Blueprint for “Offset” Four-Pentagon Die
Notes: Figure displays blueprint of the four-panel offset die that was provided to Tech-Drop firms. Blueprint
contained instructions for modifying size of die.
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Figure 13: The “Offset” Four-Pentagon Die
Notes: Figure displays the four-panel offset die that was provided to Tech-Drop firms.





Notes: Figure displays the Wikipedia “Pentagon” page. Accessed April 29, 2012.
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-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Coefficient from a Permutation Outcome












-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Coefficient from a Permutation Outcome
Histogram of 1,293,600 possible permutation outcomes.
Initial Non-Adopters
Vertical line denotes the observed regression coefficient.
Notes: Figure displays the distribution of outcomes from the permutation tests using current die use as the
measure of adoption. The left panel reports outcomes from the specification that includes all firms. The right
panel reports outcomes from the specification that includes initial non-adopters only.
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−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
Coefficient from a Permutation Outcome
Histogram of 1,293,600 possible permutation outcomes.
Initial Non−Adopters
Vertical line denotes the observed regression coefficient.
Notes: Figure displays the distribution of outcomes from the permutation tests using die purchases as the
measure of adoption. The left panel reports outcomes from the specification that includes all firms. The right
panel reports outcomes from the specification that includes initial non-adopters only.
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0 10 20 30
Firm ID
Interest rate = 19%/year (1.46%/month), prior = .5
Notes: Figure displays implied bounds on fixed costs for each firm in incentive-payment intervention, assuming
a 19 percent per year interest rate and a prior that the technology works of .5 (see Section 7.3.1). The solid
black bars indicate initial adopters and the solid green bars are adopters in response to the incentive treatment.
The black outlines indicate the implied lower bounds for non-adopters; the red outlines (which exceed the
black outlines uniformly by US$320) indicate the implied upper bounds if firms were to adopt in response to
US$320 subsidy.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
number of new adopters (simulated)
prior = 1
Notes: Figure displays distribution of number of firms from Group A predicted to respond to incentive
intervention by adopting, assuming that the intervention only affects fixed costs (i.e. not priors), based on
1000 simulation draws from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation in reported in Table 15.
See Section 7.3.1.
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Table 1: Pentagons per Sheet









(1) (2) (3) (4)
size 43.5 257.4 257.7 273.5 277.5
(10.4) (6.7) (4.4) (5.3)
size 43.75 256.3 254.4 269.0 272.0
(6.2) (9.4) (1.4) (0.0)
size 44 253.8 248.4 280.0 272.5
(8.4) (18.7) (0.7)
size 44.25 246.1 262.0 272.0
(8.3)
rescaled (to size 44) 253.6 248.3 280.0 272.9
(8.5) (11.0) (3.0) (3.9)
N (after rescaling) 274 39 8 10
Notes: Pentagons per sheet rescaled using means for each size in each
column. The N in the final row corresponds to the pooled number of ob-
servations for all die sizes. Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
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labor for cutting 0.76 1.47
(0.21) (0.30)
labor for stitching 19.67 39.24
(5.25) (12.82)






Notes: Column 1 reports the mean cost share per ball of each input using the baseline survey. Column 2
reports the cost of each input in Rupees. Total laminated rexine is the sum of the first three components.
The exchange rate is approximately Rs 100 to US$1. Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Benefits from Adopting the Offset Die
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean
A. Variable cost reduction
laminated rexine waste reduction (%) 4.39 5.19 7.93 8.31 13.43 7.69
(0.46) (0.41) (0.30) (0.05) (1.18) (0.22)
laminated rexine as share of cost (%) 34.85 39.87 44.72 51.22 55.44 45.94
(1.14) (0.71) (0.58) (0.44) (0.95) (0.66)
variable cost reduction (%) 0.60 0.80 1.10 1.37 1.94 1.17
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.17) (0.04)
B. Variable cost increase
cutter wage as share of cost (%) 0.29 0.36 0.45 0.60 0.70 0.48
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
variable cost increase (%) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
C. Net benefits
net variable cost reduction (%) 0.52 0.72 1.02 1.29 1.87 1.09
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.17) (0.04)
% net variable cost/avg % profit rate 5.27 8.10 12.34 19.86 28.98 15.45
(0.42) (0.50) (0.73) (1.21) (2.26) (0.71)
total cost savings per month (Rs 000s) 4.46 12.19 49.38 165.21 475.01 174.12
(0.60) (1.24) (5.43) (18.42) (79.89) (18.54)
days to recover fixed costs 8.48 15.98 36.61 80.34 193.92 136.94
(0.97) (1.68) (2.93) (6.51) (15.64) (44.54)
days to recover fixed costs (no die) 4.40 8.30 19.01 41.71 100.69 71.10
(0.51) (0.87) (1.52) (3.38) (8.12) (23.13)
Notes: Table reports the distribution of benefits from adopting the offset die. The 1st row reports the rexine
waste reduction across firms. The 2nd row reports laminated rexine as a share of unit costs. The 3rd row
reports the variable cost reduction from adopting the offset die, computed as the product of a firm’s rexine
waste reduction, rexine share of cost, and 33 percent (share of pentagons relative to hexagons in total rexine
costs). The 4th row reports the cutter’s wage as a share of unit costs. The 5th row is the variable labor
cost increase percentage from adopting the offset die; this is equal to the product of the cutter share of cost,
a 50 percent increase in cutting time using the offset die relative to traditional die, and 33 percent. The
6th row reports the net variable cost of reduction, which is the difference between a firm’s variable material
cost reduction and its variable labor cost increase. The 7th row reports the total cost savings per month
in Rupees (the exchange rate is approximately Rs 100 to US$1). The 8th row reports the distribution of
the number of days needed to recover all fixed costs of adoption. The 9th row reports the distribution
of the number of days needed to recover fixed costs of adoption, excluding purchasing the die; this final
row is relevant for treatment firms who received the die for free. As noted in the text, the table uses a
hot-deck imputation procedure that replaces a firm’s missing value for a particular cost component with a
draw from the empirical distribution within the firm’s stratum. Since the late responder sample was not
asked rexine share of costs (row 2) at baseline, we draw from the empirical distribution of the full sample
of initial-responder firms. We repeat this process 1,000 times and report the mean and standard deviations
(in parentheses) of each statistic. 68
Table 4: Firm Characteristics by Quantile
Mean Min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Max N
A. Initial-responder sample
avg output/month (000s) 32.2 0.8 1.6 3.5 10.0 34.6 83.0 275.0 85
avg employment 90.2 3.3 5.2 7.4 20.0 52.9 235.0 1,700.0 85
avg employment (cutters) 5.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.2 5.0 13.0 123.0 85
avg Rs/ball (head cutter) 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.9 79
avg % promotional (of size 5) 41.4 0.0 2.0 18.8 41.1 62.4 80.0 100.0 85
avg price, size 5 promotional 241.3 152.5 185.0 196.3 227.1 266.8 300.0 575.0 64
avg price, size 5 training 440.0 200.0 275.0 313.8 381.3 488.0 600.0 2,250.0 72
avg profit %, size 5 promo 8.2 2.5 3.9 5.2 8.1 10.2 12.5 20.0 64
avg profit %, size 5 training 8.0 1.6 3.2 4.6 8.5 9.9 12.5 22.2 70
avg % lamination in-house 95.7 31.3 81.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 75
% standard design (of size 5) 90.7 0.0 70.0 85.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 80
age of firm 25.4 2.0 6.0 12.0 19.5 36.5 54.0 108.0 84
CEO experience 17.0 3.0 6.0 9.0 15.5 22.0 28.0 66.0 82
head cutter experience 20.5 2.0 8.0 12.0 18.5 26.5 41.0 46.0 36
head cutter tenure 11.1 0.0 2.0 6.0 9.0 15.0 22.0 46.0 35
B. Full sample
avg output/month (000s) 34.6 0.0 2.0 4.5 15.0 37.2 86.3 278.6 116
avg employment 103.9 3.3 5.6 8.0 25.0 75.0 230.0 2,180.0 115
avg employment (cutters) 5.4 0.5 1.0 1.2 2.8 5.0 12.4 123.0 114
avg Rs/ball (head cutter) 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.0 3.0 107
avg % promotional (of size 5) 37.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 33.8 55.2 80.0 100.0 114
avg price, size 5 promotional 245.7 150.0 185.0 202.0 235.0 270.0 300.0 575.0 81
avg price, size 5 training 465.0 200.0 286.7 330.0 400.0 506.8 667.9 2,250.0 100
avg profit (%), size 5 promo 8.3 2.5 4.1 5.1 7.7 10.4 13.8 20.0 80
avg profit (%), size 5 training 8.3 1.6 3.4 5.1 8.5 10.0 13.0 22.2 95
avg % lamination in-house 96.2 25.0 85.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 104
Notes: Variables beginning with “avg. ...” represent within-firm averages across all rounds for which responses are
available. Initial responder sample is firms that responded to baseline survey. Piece rate and prices are in Rupees
(exchange rate is approximately 100 Rs/US$1). Age, experience and tenure are in years.
69
Table 5: Treatment Assignment, Tech-Drop Experiment
# Firms
Tech Drop Cash Drop No Drop Total
A. Initial responders
smallest 5 3 12 20
medium-small 6 3 13 22
medium-large 6 3 13 22
largest 6 3 12 21
total 23 12 50 85
B. Late responders
active, late response 12 5 14 31
active, refused all surveys 0 1 15 16
inactive 7 3 12 22
total 19 9 41 69
Notes: Table reports response rates, by treatment assignment, in the initial-responder sample (Panel A) and
the late-responder sample (Panel B). Active firms are those who had produced soccer balls in the previous 12
months and cut their own laminated sheets.
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Table 6: Covariate Balance, Tech-Drop Experiment
Tech Drop Cash Drop No Drop
A. Initial responders
output, normal month (000s) 34.18 26.69 41.56
(11.48) (12.15) (9.53)
output, previous year (000s) 680.17 579.97 763.33
(220.13) (225.13) (232.95)
employment, normal month 42.26 82.58 92.62
(13.25) (47.16) (35.77)
% size 5 84.61 88.96 82.67
(5.38) (4.52) (3.74)
% promotional (of size 5) 50.12 66.09 59.02
(7.12) (11.04) (5.17)
age of firm 22.70 29.25 25.76
(2.25) (4.88) (3.09)
CEO experience 16.22 20.42 16.55
(2.39) (2.70) (1.62)
CEO college indicator 0.43 0.27 0.40
(0.11) (0.14) (0.08)
head cutter experience 17.00 30.33 20.91
(2.08) (6.69) (2.68)
head cutter tenure 12.20 12.00 10.50
(2.21) (5.77) (2.11)
share cutters paid piece rate 1.00 0.83 0.89
(0.00) (0.11) (0.05)
rupees/ball (head cutter) 1.44 1.63 1.37
(0.14) (0.21) (0.10)
N 23 12 50
B. Late responders
output, normal month (000s) 27.85 34.80 63.13
(14.01) (4.99) (18.25)
employment, normal month 67.20 61.00 353.38
(48.18) (34.94) (264.52)
% size 5 68.00 72.22 96.88
(9.80) (16.16) (3.13)
% promotional (of size 5) 31.17 36.11 24.22
(9.77) (12.58) (13.28)
age of firm 17.40 39.60 35.13
(3.13) (16.68) (5.55)
N 10 5 8
Notes: Table reports balance for initial responders (i.e. responders to baseline) (Panel A) and late
responders (Panel B). There are no significant differences in the initial responder sampler. The
late responder sample has significant differences, consistent with the observation that response rates
responded to treatment assignment among initial non-adopters. Standard errors in parentheses.
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# ever active firms 23 12 50 85
# ever responded 23 12 50 85
# currently active and ever responded 22 11 46 79
# traded in 15 0 0 15
# ordered new die (beyond trade-in) 1 0 4 5
# received new die (beyond trade-in) 1 0 2 3
# ever used new die (>1000 balls) 4 0 0 4
# currently using new die (>1000 balls) 4 0 0 4
B. Full sample
# ever active firms 35 18 79 132
# ever responded 35 17 64 116
# currently active and ever responded 32 15 59 106
# traded in 19 0 0 19
# ordered new die (beyond trade-in) 1 0 6 7
# received new die (beyond trade-in) 1 0 4 5
# ever used new die (>1000 balls) 5 0 1 6
# currently using new die (>1000 balls) 5 0 1 6
Notes: Table reports adoption statistics as of August 2013 in the initial-responder sample (Panel A) and the
full sample (Panel B). The first three rows in each panel are the number active and responder firms. “# ever
responded” is the number of firms that answered at least one of the surveys across rounds. The 4th row reports
the number of firms that availed themselves of the option to trade in the 4-panel offset die for a different offset
die. The discrepancy between 5th and 6th rows is that one diemaker was particularly slow in delivering an
offset die and the firm subsequently canceled the order. The 7th row indicates the number of firms that ever
report using the die, and the 8th row is the number of firms that were using the die (to produce at least 1,000

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































log avg output/month 9.86 9.31
(0.41) (0.29)
log avg employment 3.35 3.23
(0.38) (0.25)
log avg price, size 5 promo 5.40 5.45
(0.02) (0.07)
log avg price, size 5 training 6.00 5.93
(0.06) (0.06)
avg % promotional (of size 5) 34.90 32.04
(6.20) (7.26)
avg Rs/ball, head cutter 1.45 1.63
(0.10) (0.15)
CEO university indicator 0.56 0.36
(0.18) (0.15)
CEO experience 15.50 16.50
(3.60) (3.60)
age of firm 24.53 20.60
(2.83) (2.28)
N 15 16
Notes: Table reports baseline balance in the Incentive-Payment Experiment. This sample is the 31 tech-drop
firms from the Tech-Drop Experiment who were active as of September 2013. There are no statistical difference
between treatment and control groups. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 12: “Test” Results
firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
time 2:52 2:40 3:03 3:02 2:59 2:28 2:25 2:45 2:30 2:50
die size 43.5 43.75 44 44 43.5 43.5 43.5 43.5 44 43.5
# pentagons 270 272 273 272 282 279 279 272 272 267
Notes: Table reports the times achieved by cutters at the 10 Group A firms who agreed to the incentive payment
intervention. The 2nd row reports the time, in minutes, to cut a single rexine sheet with the offset die. The
3rd row reports the size of the die (in mm) used by the cutter. The 4th row reports the number of pentagons
achieved. Note that the average time to cut with the traditional die is 2:15.
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Table 13: Incentive-Payment Experiment Results (Current Use as Outcome)
Dep. var.: currently using offset die and produced > 1, 000 balls















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rec’d treatment 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.59*** 0.63***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18)
assigned to group A 0.68*** 0.32** 0.62*** 0.38***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
stratum dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.57 0.69 0.60 0.69 0.50 0.57 0.36 0.57
N 31 31 31 31 26 26 26 26
Notes: Table reports results of incentive-payment experiment on adoption rates using current use as the measure
of adoption. The left panel includes all firms. For this sample, the p-value testing the null hypothesis that
treatment has no effect in the ITT specification using 25,872,000 possible permutations of treatment assignment
is 3.04 percent. The right panel includes only initial non-adopter firms. For this sample, the corresponding
p-value from the possible 1,293,600 permutations is 3.04 percent. All regressions include stratum dummies.
Significance: * .10; ** .05; *** 0.01.
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Table 14: Incentive-Payment Experiment Results (Die Purchase as Outcome)
Dep. var.: purchased first offset die (beyond trade-in) after Sept. 1, 2013















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rec’d treatment 0.42** 0.40** 0.40** 0.38**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
assigned to group A 0.68*** 0.27** 0.62*** 0.23*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
stratum dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.57 0.40 0.24 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.22 0.40
N 31 31 31 31 26 26 26 26
Notes: Table reports results of incentive-payment experiment on adoption rates using additional die purchases
(beyond the trade-in offer) after September 2013 as the measure of adoption. he left panel includes all firms.
For this sample, the p-value testing the null hypothesis that treatment has no effect in the ITT specification
using 25,872,000 possible permutations of treatment assignment is 4.28 percent. The right panel includes only
initial non-adopter firms. For this sample, the corresponding p-value from the possible 1,293,600 permutations
is 21.42 percent. All regressions include stratum dummies. Significance: * .10; ** .05; *** 0.01.
78
Table 15: Quantitative Plausibility of Learning-Subsidy Explanation
Value of prior
.01 .05 .1 .25 .5 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Estimates of fixed costs
estimate of θ 6.58*** 7.67*** 8.29*** 9.17*** 9.85*** 10.53***
(0.41) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
estimate of σε 1.65** 1.23*** 1.20*** 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.18***
(0.64) (0.43) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37)
B. P-values of observing ≥ 5 adopters in incentive experiment
0.166 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
C. ITT estimate
assigned to group A 0.22** 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Notes: Sample is tech-drop firms still active at time of second experiment (Sept. 2013). Estimates for for θ and
σε come from maximizing the likelihood function in (11)-(??). P-values based on 1000 simulation draws of log
fixed costs from normal distribution with mean θ̂ and standard deviation σ̂ε for corresponding value of prior.
Panel C reports average and standard deviation of the ITT estimates across the 1000 simulations. Significance:
* .10; ** .05; *** 0.01.
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Table A.1: Means by Firm Size Bin
Firm Size Bins Late
1 2 3 4 Responders
A. Initial-responder sample
avg output/month (000s) 5.43 6.18 24.49 93.08
avg employment 11.68 13.29 53.07 284.43
avg employment (cutters) 1.25 1.79 3.84 16.36
cutters paid piece rate indicator 0.90 1.00 0.91 0.84
avg Rs/ball (head cutter) 1.53 1.54 1.51 1.38
avg % promotional (of size 5) 49.44 51.40 34.47 30.61
avg price, size 5 promotional 239.57 223.76 249.23 254.26
avg price, size 5 training 387.09 329.23 442.18 617.36
avg profit %, size 5 promo 6.15 7.20 9.58 10.16
avg profit %, size 5 training 6.95 7.00 8.25 9.86
avg % lamination in-house 90.64 92.74 99.77 99.82
% standard design (of size 5) 89.00 94.43 90.00 89.21
age of firm 16.95 20.09 24.67 39.81
CEO experience 19.00 16.55 15.75 16.85
head cutter experience 13.83 20.44 26.82 17.60
head cutter tenure 12.50 7.33 13.55 11.00
N 20 22 22 21
A. Full sample
avg output/month (000s) 5.43 6.18 24.49 93.08 41.23
avg employment 11.68 13.29 53.07 284.43 142.65
avg employment (cutters) 1.25 1.79 3.84 16.36 4.42
avg Rs/ball (head cutter) 1.53 1.54 1.51 1.38 1.61
avg % promotional (of size 5) 49.44 51.40 34.47 30.61 23.93
avg price, size 5 promotional 239.57 223.76 249.23 254.26 262.34
avg price, size 5 training 387.09 329.23 442.18 617.36 529.49
avg profit %, size 5 promo 6.15 7.20 9.58 10.16 8.68
avg profit %, size 5 training 6.95 7.00 8.25 9.86 9.29
avg % lamination in-house 90.64 92.74 99.77 99.82 97.41
N 20 22 22 21 31
Notes: Size bins are defined as quartiles of output in a normal month from baseline survey. Same bins are used
as strata in technology-drop experiment. Late responders (i.e. who did not respond at baseline) could not be
assigned to a size bin by this definition. Piece rate and prices are in Rupees (exchange rate is approximately
100 Rs/US$1). Age, experience and tenure are in years.
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